A Message from the Chair
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The Search for Cultural Authenticity

As summer begins, it seems a good time to think about the beach.

American popular culture is obsessed with authenticity and awash with artificiality. The pleasure of special effects in film is enough to draw audiences to look at the latest digital animation, but bands are routinely derided for losing their authenticity when they get too successful. Why? It comes, I think, from the fact that America is a settler society, and even the Native Americans who lived here before Europeans arrived often migrated to places they now define as their authentic homes. We are a society of immigrants, as the now-raging immigration debate makes clear in the storms of hatred and compassion, nativism and identification. We want to know what makes an authentic American as much as we want to believe in an authentic American culture, but this yearning is based on the fundamentally artificial nature of “American culture” and “American character.” Sometimes we create the myth of a core by defining what’s outside it. Sometimes we define authenticity by ghetto life, and the patterns of artificial differentiation that have created this site of otherness.

The most authentic practice in American culture is settlement, and settle we do in expanding suburbs – the artificial utopias and unnatural habitations that we spread across the continent. We may search for authenticity, but use artificiality to get there. There’s no place like home in a development. Settlements exude artificiality and their denial of the natural,

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Editor’s Note

This issue marks the final “Books of Note” column produced by Pete Peterson. Pete has been an all-around stalwart of the section for the past two decades, ever since serving as its founding chair. In particular, however, on behalf of all the previous editors as well as all members of the section, I wish to thank Pete for his column, which has added so much to the newsletter. Thanks as well to Claire, who had a hand in many of the columns. It’s been a great run, and we’ll miss this expression of Pete’s vision and voice.

Please let me know your ideas for submissions!

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Locating the Body in Cultural Sociology:
Durkheim on "Organico-Psychic" Phenomena
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Introduction

In the Elementary Forms and elsewhere in his later work, Émile Durkheim developed a “religious sociology” that is an inspiration for much of contemporary cultural sociology. In this research note I discuss the constellation of intellectual and disciplinary factors that shaped Durkheim’s treatment of bodily and psychological phenomena—what Durkheim referred to as “organico-psyche” phenomena. For various reasons Durkheim was initially drawn to biological and psychological explanations, and to “organicist” sociology, but he later claimed to reject arguments based on biology and psychology even as these disciplines continued to influence his sociological thought. While reductionist explanations from the natural sciences may occasionally appear as threats to sociology (e.g. Wilson 1975;

The Cultures of Western and Muslim Scientific Minds
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I-The Cultures of the Two Minds

The focus of this short article is on what we would like to call “the cultures of the learned minds” in the old Muslim world and in the modern Western world. For the former, the minds of Muslim scientists and scholars use both reason and revelation in the creation as well as the acquisition of science and knowledge. (The world ‘knowledge’ is used in this article to cover all branches of human knowledge including what is called today scientific branches, like the Natural Sciences.)

Here, there is an intimate cooperation between the sacred and the mundane in the field of science and knowledge. The two Arabic terms for that combination are Aql (reason) and Naql (revelation). As to the situation in the modern Western

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Tiryakian 1976), as they did during sociology’s early years, on the whole, there is no reason why cultural sociologists today should categorically resist biological and psychological explanations of social phenomena, especially when those explanations do not reduce culture to biology or psychology. Rather, cultural sociology can be enriched by ideas from psychology, biology and related fields, because our bodies and brains have evolved to produce and reproduce cultural symbols and traditions (Geertz 1973, ch. 3; Sewell 1997: 43-46). A cultural sociology that accounts for “organico-psychic” influences on culture would be in keeping with Durkheim’s unique legacy of combining philosophical sophistication with respect for and knowledge of biology and psychology, and with his interest in macro-micro interactions and ‘downward causation’ from culture and society to the individual.

Eclectic Spiritualism, Biology, and Organicist Sociology
In response to Germany’s humiliating military defeat of France in 1871, through the last quarter of the nineteenth century there was among French intellectuals a widely felt need to promote social solidarity in support of the teetering Third French Republic (Jones 1986: 11-12; Logue 1983: 97). During this period, though philosophy was dominant in French universities and there were virtually no social sciences, many young intellectuals sought more socially engaged forms of scholarship. Young French intellectuals, impressed with the achievements of Lamarckian and Darwinian biology, sought to extend scientific reasoning and methods to the social and moral spheres. Auguste Comte had a profound influence on this movement in the direction of socially engaged positivist social science (Lukes 1972: 67). Comte had long poured scorn on the “eclectic spiritualism” that dominated French philosophy departments. Eclectic spiritualism was a synthetic and psychological approach to philosophy. Its leading proponent, Victor Cousin, encouraged students to study the history of philosophy in order glean truths from each major philosophical system. No system of thought was seen to be false, only incomplete. Cousin, who had been educated mainly in literature, had an enormous influence on French philosophy. He introduced the history of philosophy as a major discipline in the higher schools in France, and guided the teaching of philosophy in French lycées for a generation (see Brooks 1998). 

The search for authenticity in American popular culture is a way to try to find the human voice against works of the human hand, and to hear the sounds of the sea or winds in the mountains. These have become our touchstones of truth, defining what seems missing when a band gets too tame or too settled in its ways.
In his lycée and at the École Normale Supérieure, Durkheim was trained in philosophy from a curriculum informed by Cousin’s eclecticism. Although he would later distance himself from Cousin’s approach, Durkheim’s sociology shows clear philosophical and eclectic spiritualist influences (Brooks 1998, ch. 6). Durkheim’s philosophical education prepared him to appreciate and engage in sophisticated philosophical reasoning and criticism. And the central concerns of eclecticism and religion, lie at the heart of Durkheimian sociology. Eclecticism’s philosophical methods and principles, opposition to biological reductionism, and insistence on humans’ moral autonomy became elements of Durkheim’s sociology as well.

By the 1870s, eclecticism had lost much of its power to convince. The first really effective attack on Cousin and his system had come from Hippolyte Taine, whose popular book Les philosophes françaises du xixe siècle (1857) mocked Cousin’s reliance on oratory rather than reasoned argument, his professional opportunism, and the logical inadequacy of his psychological method and assumptions (Simon 1965: 54). A complementary assault was delivered by the organicist sociologist Alfred Espinas in a thesis showing analogical relationships between human and animal societies. In Des sociétés animales (1878), Espinas had argued for the progressive continuity of all social phenomena, beginning with individual biological organisms and proceeding through animal societies to human societies. Espinas insisted that consciousness and moral impulses had natural origins, and were found in rudimentary states in animals. Thus, to create sociology, Espinas and other organicist sociologists insisted that it was necessary, first, to be familiar with biology and psychology, and then to observe social facts, classify them, and reveal their laws (Barberis 2003: 60).

Organicist sociology adopted the Comtean hierarchy of the sciences in which each level of phenomena contained in itself the phenomena of the previous levels. This hierarchical vision supported Comte’s contempt for psychology. Durkheim, however, does not appear to have shared Comte’s disdain. During his travels in Germany on a scholarship in 1886, Durkheim had been impressed by Wilhelm Wundt’s psychology lab. He greatly admired Wundt’s experimental work, with its concentration on “precise and restricted” problems and its avoidance of “vague generalizations and metaphysical possibilities” (1887: 433; qtd. in Lukes 1972: 91).

As the end of the nineteenth century approached, in an intellectual atmosphere of reaction against the earlier confidence in science (Paul 1967–8), sociologists’ critiques of the organicist model built to a critical mass. The Third Congress of the Institut International de Sociologie, held in 1897, was largely devoted to the discussion of organicist sociology. Alfred Espinas, René Worms and other organicists supported it. Most of the other participants, including Gabriel Tarde, attacked it (Barberis 2003: 62). Though the debates ended without resolution, the consensus seemed to be that sociologists no longer found the organic metaphor useful.

As late as 1884, Durkheim had claimed to be an “evolutionist” (Barberis 2003: 65), and to admire the work of Alfred Espinas. In his first sociology course at Bordeaux, at the end of his inaugural lecture, Durkheim defined the social mission of sociology in the following way. Given that the social problem was a product of the weakening of the collective spirit, it was necessary to regain awareness of the organic unity of society. In The Division of Labor in Society, published in 1893, Durkheim compared society with an organism and individuals with cells (1984 [1893]: 38). Yet two years later, in the introduction to The Rules of Sociological Method, Durkheim tried to distance himself from accusations of positivism and materialism, and from the organic analogy. Thus Durkheim’s position on the use of the organic analogy and of other biological concepts in sociology changed in the 1890s. This was partly the effect of critiques from philosophers, but it was also motivated by a desire to distance himself from René Worms and other organicist sociologists (Barberis 2003: 65). Yet key concepts in Durkheim’s analysis, including organ and function, morphology and physiology, and the normal versus the pathological, are derived from biology. And like the organicists, Durkheim wanted to establish the reality of society, its complexity, the fact that it was a natural entity, and the possibility of its scientific study.

The up-and-coming Durkheim was an exceptional student educated in philosophy in his lycée and at the École Normale Supérieure. Early in his career he was much impressed by the natural sciences and, at least for a period, Spencerian evolutionism (Lukes 1972: 79–84) and the organicist sociology of Espinas and Worms (Barberis 2003: 65–6). Yet with many of his contemporaries, in the 1890s Durkheim largely abandoned organicism, sought to distance himself from its proponents, and insisted that sociology was fundamentally independent of biology and psychology.

**Sociology and the “Inferior Sciences”**

As he rose to prominence within the French university system, Durkheim thought it necessary to proclaim sociology an independent science, and in so doing to distinguish it from psychology. He claimed that there was between the two sciences “the same break in continuity as between biology and the physico-chemical sciences” (1901; qtd. in Lukes 1972: 16). Durkheim’s view of sociology as the science of sui generis social facts, and his declaration of the new science’s independence from psychology, helped to establish the young discipline. While these tactics have been criticized by prominent Durkheim interpreters, Durkheim’s strict demarcation of the boundary between sociology and psychology is defensible on philosophical grounds. Drawing on the philosophy of science tradition, Sawyer (2002) argues that questions of reductionism, whether of psychological to neurological concepts, or sociological to psychological ones, are not ontological questions about the existence of higher-level phenomena, but rather pragmatic questions about scientific vocabularies. In Fodor’s (1974) terminology, scientific disciplines have “natural kind terms” that require “bridge laws” if they are to be reduced to the science of a lower level. As there is no a priori reason to believe that this will be possible for any given pair of scientific disciplines, at times, higher-level descriptions, such as descriptions of social and cultural phenomena, may be better, more useful descriptions than are lower-level ones, such as of psychological and biological phenomena (Sawyer 2002: 230).

As sociology grew in popularity and appeared less in need of distinguishing itself from psychology, Durkheim became increasingly insistent that the realities studied by sociology and psychology were equally mental, though of a different nature.
and governed by different laws. He conceded that collective and individual factors are “closely inter-related” and even that the latter can “facilitate the explanation” of the former (Lukes 1972: 19). While Durkheim was equivocal about the role of biological and psychological factors in the explanation of social facts, such factors play a crucial role at various points in his theories, such as the notion of unrestrained and limitless desires in his account of anomie; his conception of a natural distribution of talents; and his doctrine about the biologically determined characteristics of womanhood (Wityak and Wallace 1981). Durkheim also viewed the body as a major source of cultural symbols, and noted that blood, hair, and bodily fat were treated as intrinsically sacred in many societies. The body can be a major location for cultural symbols, as in tattooing (Durkheim 1912[1995]: 233-4). Finally, the body provides social potentialities which provide the means by which individuals become energetically attached to the symbolic order of society (Shilling 2005: 212), as bodily congregation is itself “an exceptionally powerful stimulant” (Durkheim 1912[1995]: 217).

The constellation of intellectual currents and disciplinary considerations that led Durkheim to sharply distinguish sociology from organico-psychic explanation does not appear to be relevant to contemporary sociologists, aside from as a matter of intellectual history. Sociology today is a well-established discipline, under no immediate existential threat from reductionist biological or psychological forms of social explanation. Yet sociologists, in particular cultural sociologists influenced by Durkheim’s later work on religion, have allowed Durkheim’s strict separation of social from biological and psychological facts to continue mostly unchallenged. One can reasonably suggest that the attraction and theoretical sophistication of the Elementary Forms results from Durkheim’s unique combination of influences, including his background in, and thorough digestion of, philosophy and eclectic spiritualism, and organicist sociology, biology, and psychology. This combination may be difficult to reproduce in an era of advanced disciplinary specialization. However, it may be worthwhile to try to develop strands of cultural sociology that take bodily and mental phenomena into account. I would suggest that two areas of inquiry strongly influenced by Durkheim—the sociology of morality, and the sociology of culture and cognition—stand to benefit from more sophisticated theorization of organico-psychic phenomena.

Morality

Morality is arguably the central animating concern of Durkheim’s sociology. Wallwork (1972: 183) argues that sociology was a mere “by-product of his concern with moral issues.” That is, Durkheim’s concern with morality led him as a sociologist to devote most of his attention to the moral elements of social life (Ritzer and Bell 1981: 972-3). In recent years, morality has reemerged as a topic of sociological speculation, notably in Bauman’s writings on modernity and postmodernity, and in debates over Bourdieuan sociology and religion. If sociologists interested in morality wish to build on Durkheim’s legacy, they may do well to take into account bodily and psychological influences on morality, rather than repeat the errors of those nineteenth-century philosophers who claimed it impossible to find a biological basis for morality, and who felt that the “invasion” of the field of ethics by the natural sciences must be repulsed. (Caro 1876; qtd. in Simon 1965: 51). In contrast, Durkheim had praised the attempts of writers of his day, particularly German ones, who gave “inductive accounts of complex, sui generis moral phenomena by means of observation, analysis and comparison, and thus to produce a social science of morality” (Lukes 1972: 91). Rather than one-dimensional sociological views of the bodily bases of morality (see Schilling and Mellor [1998] on Bauman and Giddens), sociologists could contribute to scholarly understanding of the interactions of universal moral emotions such as shame and guilt (Haidt 2001; Rozin et al. 1999) with social and cultural influences (see Vaisey 2007). Different cultures and sub-cultures, it seems, use universal emotional capacities for different social purposes—an example of Durkheimian “downward causation” (Sawyer 2002) from society to the individual (see Ignatow 2008)

Culture and cognition

While sociologists have in recent decades taken an interest in both cognition and the body, sociological theories of culture and cognition, and of the body, have overlapped little if at all. This has left sociology out of step with a broad shift in the human sciences toward conceiving of knowledge as thoroughly embodied, rather than in terms of disembodied information sequences. In a recent paper (Ignatow 2007), I have argued that a view of cognition as embodied, as shaped by bodily and emotional inputs, has far-reaching consequences for the sociology of culture and cognition. People think, feel, and act through a habitus made up of a large number of bodily operations, as first Piaget (see Lizardo 2004) and more recently cognitive linguists, have argued. Basic bodily operations can structure discourses ‘internally’; thus to order to identify and measure “meaning structures” (Mohr 1998)—cultural models, schemas, and frames—it can be useful to think, first, in terms of basic bodily operations such as forward-backward, high-low, in-out, and right- and left-handedness (e.g. Hertz 1960).

Conclusions

Contemporary cultural sociologists write in an intellectual and disciplinary environment that does not require them to sharply distinguish social and cultural explanation from biology and psychology. Why not take advantage of sociology’s disciplinary position to strengthen cultural arguments, and build on Durkheim’s legacy of interdisciplinarity? Arguments for downward causation from culture to the individual, and for culture’s analytic and empirical autonomy, can be strengthened by recognizing the rootedness of cultural models in the body and mind. Neo-Durkheimian cultural sociology, for example, can be strengthened by recognizing that the sacred/profane distinction is only one example of a “cultural code” with deep roots in bodily systems. There are many other such embodied cultural structures worthy of sociological attention. Also, for Bourdieuan analysis, if we conceptualize the habitus as a nexus of bodily operations and social and cultural associations, we can anticipate that people will participate more intensely and for longer durations in groups when the group’s discourse is internally structured in ways that resonate with elements of the individual’s habitus. The task then becomes to identify such isomorphisms using content analytic methods. In this way, sociological exploration of embodied, endogenous cultural structures might complement recent studies exploring how small groups’ discourses are shaped by exogenous so-
cial structures (e.g. Martin 2002; Yeung 2005). Finally, if sociologists interested in culture and cognition would afford more theoretical weight to the body, and to the many roles it plays in knowledge and thought, sociology would likely be better positioned to contribute to debates in psychology, cognitive science, and other disciplines. Thus there would seem to be more than a few intellectual and disciplinary reasons for sociologists to theorize the interplay of “organico-psycho” phenomena with culture and society.

Acknowledgments: My warmest thanks to Steve Vaisey, Omar Lizardo, and Ilana Silber for their thoughtful comments and criticisms.

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world, its learned culture has made, since the Renaissance, the separation between reason-based and sacred-based knowledge and science rather official in the field of science and knowledge creation and acquisition.

The sociological perspective helps understand and explain the differences between the Muslim and the Western minds with regard to the acquisition and creation of knowledge and science. On the one hand, the learned Muslim Aql-Naql mind is the outcome of the Muslim culture that sees no contradictions between Aql and Naql knowledge. It emphasizes rather their harmony (Shahine 1997). On the other hand, the Western learned mind has witnessed a sweeping liberation from the influence of Christian theological thought since the Renaissance. Rational reasoning, experimentation, the collection of empirical data have become the only basis for Western contemporary knowledge in the Two Cultures (Snow 1963). Al-Jabri sees the difference between these two minds as a result of the way each one of them classifies in priority the following: Man, Nature, God. On the one hand, the Greek European mind gives more importance to the first two. On the other hand, in the Muslim Arab mind priority is given to God and Man. This certainly helps account for the non-readiness of the former and the readiness of the latter to adopt the perspective of the Aql-Naql mind (Al-Jabri 1988:27-31).

II-No Western Welcome for the Naql Mind

With these cultural differences toward knowledge acquisition and creation taken into account, it becomes easy to understand why Western scholars have often been impressed by the Aql side of Ibn Khaldun’s mind and at the same time they have denied and criticized him for his use and reference to the Naql side (Lacoste 1998:241-257; Schmit 1999:66-67).

The presence of these two minds in the world of knowledge acquisition and creation is expected to create controversy. The Western modern mind looks with suspicion and even hostility to knowledge coloured by religion. On the other hand, the classical traditional scientific Muslim mind finds support for the human-made knowledge and science in the fundamental Revealed Islamic texts. This goes against the above Western claim that religion and science must always be kept separate. The Muslim mind rejects the Western claim by saying that not all religious texts should be disqualified for not meeting the truths of hard and soft modern sciences. The Quranic and authentic Hadith (sayings of the prophet Mohammad) texts have found strong basis in modern knowledge and science as we will see later.

Islam has one single Quranic version, not many like the Christian religion. This preserves the integrity of the revealed divine truths in the Quranic verses. Furthermore, Muslim scientists and scholars believe that Islam is the last divine message to mankind (the last phase on the evolutionary continuum of divine religious revelations) and as such its revealed texts are bound to hold authentic truths on the natural and human phenomena of the world and the universe.

III- Legitimacy of the Aql-Naql Mind

Since the Western learned modern mind is the widely dominant adopted reference for knowledge- and science-creation and acquisition in contemporary times, a discussion is appropriate here to see if there is ground or justification for the Muslim Aql-Naql mind to stand on its own feet and even compete with the Western mind in knowledge- and science-acquisition and creation.

First, the Muslim learned mind is strongly pro-knowledge- and science- acquisition and creation. The Quranic text (the first Naql/source in Islam) is an open invitation to Muslims and Non-Muslims alike to think and reflect on the world/universe’s endless phenomena. It is estimated that a sixth of the Quran’s verses speak directly or indirectly about the importance of science/knowledge of the Two Cultures for humans. It is in this sense that “true scientists and scholars are the inheritors of the prophets” according to the Prophet Muhammad (the second Naql source in Islam) who strongly and repeatedly appeals to Muslims to seek knowledge: “seek knowledge from the cradle to the grave” or “seek knowledge even in the far distant China.” The knowledge-seeking ethics is, thus, deeply rooted in the Muslim Aql-Naql mind.

Second, both the Quranic and the Hadith texts include explicit statements or implicit references to scientific facts about various phenomena in the world/universe which have been discovered only recently by modern science. One example from the Quran is sufficient to make the point. The Quranic text has its own terminology for the newly developed science of embryology. It described over fourteen centuries ago the specific stages of human development this way: “We created man from the quintessence of mud, thereafter We placed him as a drop of liquid (sperm) in a firm lodging (the womb). Then We fashioned the sperm (Nutfah) into something that clings (Alakah) which We fashioned into a chewed-like lump (Muthgha). The chewed-like lump is fashioned into bones which are then covered with flesh. Then, We developed it into another act of Creation. Blessed is God, the best Creator” (the Quran: 23/13). The famous embryologist Keith Moore has strongly praised the Quranic precise terms for the phases of human embryo development (Moore, 1982).

Furthermore, in his comparative analysis of the place of scientific facts in the Bible and the Quran, the late French surgeon Maurice Bucaille comes to this conclusion: the Quranic statements are in perfect agreement with modern scientific facts. Thus, modern scientific knowledge explains certain Quranic verses which had not been understood before the present day (Bucaille 1976:254).

Such credible scientific evidence in favour of the meanings of the Quranic verses can only strengthen the stand of the Aql-Naql cognitive Muslim mind in the past and in the present among Muslims, and it may as well solicit some attention on the part of the modern learned Western mind in the Two Cultures to reconsider its negative attitude toward the validity of knowledge whose source is revelation. This may improve the image of Islam among the educated Westerners in time of crisis between the West and Islam.
Third, it could be argued that the adoption of the Aql-Naqil mind is also justified because human-made knowledge always remains problematic. This type of knowledge is a combination of correctness and error. It is a mixture of certainty and doubt. Man’s use of his thoughtful and analytical reasoning often involves probabilities of truth and falsehood in the corpus of knowledge he attains. Thinkers, philosophers and scientists have been, throughout the ages, aware of the problematic nature of the correctness/error dimensions that characterize the human-made knowledge (Wallerstein 1999, 2001).

The reasons for this state of affairs are numerous, of which we mention here the most important: 1- the complexity of causes and relationships that link together the phenomena of nature, society and human personality; 2- Man’s cognitive limitation as far as having total knowledge of all phenomena, particularly those beyond the world of the five human senses; 3-the above factors making it difficult for social scientists to liberate themselves completely from bias in their attempt to study objectively the cultural-psycho-social phenomena and issues.

Ibn Khaldun’s law of al-Mutabaqah (the matching between historical events and human social realities) in the Science of History aimed at minimizing the pitfalls of historical knowledge in which Muslim historians were involved in before and during Ibn Khaldun’s time. This law was meant to raise the level of rightness and credibility in historical knowledge. Something similar could be said as well of the influence of the ethics of Positivism and Empiricism on modern knowledge. But there is no doubt that modern knowledge has not been and will hardly be able to exhaust all the causes that lead to errors and pitfalls in the human-made knowledge. Being limited in scope (in terms of its correctness and certainty in its facts), human-made knowledge would legitimately and modestly need divine knowledge as its compliment to help humans deal particularly with controversial ethical, moral issues that have proven to be rather difficult to settle for the good of Man and society when relying only on human reasoning. The latter is hardly value-free in these matters.

Finally, the Western learned mind’s hostility against religion is the result of special socio-historical circumstances which Western civilization has known since the Renaissance in the confrontation between The Church, on the one hand, and the scientists and the large public of Western modernizing societies, on the other. This specific Western experience has created among Westerners a culture of separation and distrust between science and religion. Thus, they have great difficulty to understand, let alone accept, the principle of cooperation between religion and science as shown in the Aql-Naqil Muslim mind.

IV-The Aql-Naqil Mind as an Ideal Mind

From an Islamic perspective, the Aql-Naqil mind is the ideal mind to reach out for a more credible and complete solid corpus of knowledge (Dhaouadi 2003-4, 1997, 1990). Ibn Khaldun’s Umran mind in his Muqaddimah is an excellent manifestation of the work of the Aql-Naqil Muslim mind. Ibn Khaldun’s Umran mind may be considered as the avant-garde of today’s Islamization of knowledge movement.

This type of mind has not only accomplished a good standard social science Handbook (the Muqaddimah), but he has achieved, by all objective accounts, a real breakthrough in the field of social sciences not only in the Arab Muslim civilization but also in the entire long history of ideas of the rest of human civilizations. Ibn Khaldun made explicit reference to this: “In a way, it is an entirely original science. In fact I have not come across a discussion along these lines by anyone” (Dawood, 1977:39).

Ibn Khaldun’s high intellectual pioneering Umran (social science) work raises, therefore, serious questions (Wallerstein 1999, 2001) about the assumptions of the modern Western mind’s persistent claims that true science and authentic knowledge can not be obtained if religion and science are not kept separate from each other. As shown, these claims are based on the Western knowledge/science’s special experience with the Church. Thus, they should not be generalized to other religions’ experiences with knowledge-creation and acquisition. Ibn Khaldun’s Aql-Naqil Muslim mind strongly defies the substance of those claims, and opens the lead for scientists and scholars to seek more than one way (Wilson 1999) in order to create and establish solid knowledge in the Two Cultures.

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In the midst of its diversity, what is it that unifies cultural sociology?

On May 4, 2007, 120 faculty and graduate students from around the U.S. gathered at The Great Hall at the University of California, San Diego for the Third Annual UCSD Culture Conference on “Cultural Sociology and Its Diversity” to discuss this question. The Great Hall, with its floor-to-ceiling windows that ushered in the San Diego sunshine and its sweeping wooden beams, provided an inspirational setting for this meeting of cultural minds. The presence of Joseph Gusfield, whom keynote speaker Michèle Lamont (Harvard University) referred to as the “sociological Geertz,” served as a reminder of the heritage of cultural sociology, while the presentation of new scholarship in the field revealed the momentum that cultural perspectives have gained over the past twenty years.

A theme that has developed over the three-year history of the conference is to think about culture not as independent or dependent variable but as “constitutive” of social life. One way in which culture is constitutive is in its generation of boundaries and definitions. This was a central component in the talks of both keynote speakers, Lamont and Katherine Newman (Princeton University). For Lamont the question was how peer reviewers define excellence when evaluating grant proposals. How do evaluators from diverse disciplines come to agree upon a common definition of excellence? For Newman the question was how members of different countries define adulthood, especially at a time when one of the conventional indicators of adulthood—moving out of the house—is occurring later in many countries. How do people in different countries make sense of the same demographic trend?

Lamont, the morning keynote speaker, presented her new work on disciplinary understandings of excellence in peer review settings in the social sciences and humanities. In her talk entitled, “Cream Rising: Peer Review and the Definition of Excellence in the Social Sciences and the Humanities,” she discussed the sociocultural processes that constitute the peer review process, including the enforcement of disciplinary boundaries of expertise, norms of collegiality, alliances among committee members, and strategic voting. Her work challenges both the view of optimists who see the process as completely meritocratic as well as the view of optimists who see the process as completely idiosyncratic. Instead she presented a complex portrait of the peer review process with both its idiosyncrasies and its meritocratic. In her afternoon keynote entitled “Failure to Launch? Toward a Cultural Analysis of Delayed Adulthood in Western Europe and Japan,” Newman presented some of the results from her new research on the contrasting pathways towards delayed adulthood in five different countries. Noticing that many countries are simultaneously recognizing that men and women are living in their parents’ homes longer than in the previous generation, Newman’s study seeks to understand how people in different national contexts make sense of this trend and, in the process, how they define adulthood. While respondents in Spain and Japan generally define adulthood as a set of ideal values and notice a trend in delayed adulthood, Newman found that Spanish respondents interpreted this as a structural problem while Japanese respondents interpreted it as a moral problem. Delayed adulthood appears to be absent in Nordic countries due to both a negative normative assessment of staying with one’s parents past age 18 as well as the structural support that comes from a strong welfare state.

Lamont and Newman both shared rich interview data to illustrate the cultural constitution of definitions and boundaries. However, a question that many members of the audience raised was where definitions and definitional capacities derived from. Where did the cultural capacities or the social graces of the peer reviewers derive from? And, where do people learn that delayed adulthood is or is not a problem?

In the middle of the day, four panelists presented how cultural perspectives inform their sociological subfields. In concert with the keynote speakers, many of the panelists discussed how culture infuses the activities of defining, categorizing, and evaluating.

Marion Fourcade-Gourinchas (U.C. Berkeley) explained how a new perspective on the role of culture in markets has emerged in economic sociology in the last ten years. This new perspective asserts that markets don’t just affect or get affected by culture but are cultural in the sense that they are saturated by normative prescriptions. In other words, markets themselves are moral projects which establish a particular moral order.

John Skrentny (U.C. San Diego) discussed how more contemporary understandings of culture have been marginal and underdeveloped in most studies of race and ethnicity. Fears of “blaming the victim” and the “ghost of Oscar Lewis” appear to haunt the field of race/ethnicity, limiting the entrance of newer formulations of culture. The conceptualization of culture as a trait is more dominant in studies of race and ethnicity than the conceptualization of culture as part of the process through which racial/ethnic groups are dominated, constructed, and categorized.

Dawne Moon (U.C. Berkeley), in contrast to the more limited use of cultural perspectives in race/ethnicity, revealed the vibrant influence of culture in studies of sexuality. She applauded the search for new metaphors besides the market imagery for discussing sexuality and encouraged scholars of sexuality to understand identities not as coherent wholes but as potentially contradictory.

In the final subfield assessment, Richard Madsen (UCSD) discussed how the study of culture intersects with the comparative study of religion. He spoke of the pitfalls of applying Western definitions of religion to other contexts, giving examples from the study of religion in China to reveal how the application of Western definitions can obscure findings.

One theme that emerged in the discussion of the cross-pollination of culture with the subfields is how history matters...
in the degree to which and precisely how culture informs a particular subfield. More recently constituted subfields, like the sociology of sexuality, have been more informed by cultural perspectives than earlier constituted subfields, like the study of race and ethnicity. With a new generation of cross-trained students with cultural perspectives in their repertoire, there seems to be greater extension of cultural perspectives into all fields.

While cultural perspectives have been somewhat successful at entering other subfields, the collective sense of conference participants was that cultural perspectives need to move beyond cultural circles and more greatly influence and inform public debates. For example, one discussion centered on whether or not it is possible to point to cultural differences among social groups’ achievement gaps without “blaming the victim.” Another animated discussion centered on how cultural arguments can influence public discourse on sexuality. There seemed to be a consensus among those present that rather than making general statements about whether culture is constraining or enabling, scholars need to be studying the empirical conditions under which it is constraining or enabling and bringing these findings into public discourse.

In Durkheimian fashion, this annual meeting appeared to revive cultural sociology’s group sentiments through intellectual communion. The meeting reaffirmed the value of cultural perspectives, while also yielding a call for cultural perspectives to spread outward and not just be inwardly consolidated.

Articles based on the panels on culture in the subfields from the first three years of the conference will be published in a special issue of *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (forthcoming September 2008).

The conference was organized by Amy Binder, Mary Blair-Loy, John Evans, Kwai Ng, and Stephanie Chan. It was sponsored by the Department of Sociology, the Division of the Social Sciences, and the Department of Communication at UCSD.

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**Books of Note**

*Richard A. Peterson, Vanderbilt University*

Cerulo, Karen A. *Never Saw It Coming: Cultural Challenges to Envisioning the Worst*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Cerulo invokes an American predilection to ignore “worst case scenarios” when considering natural disasters, terrorist threats, health hazards, human exploitation, and the dire consequences of technical advances. Drawing on an impressively wide range of cases, she shows that careful reporters using hard evidence warn of the dangers, and that they are systematically ignored because those able to control the flow of information and opinion find the truth to be inconvenient in the light of their collective interests. But Cerulo doesn’t just document the problem, she looks carefully at situations in which people effectively anticipate and deal with serious problems to highlight the structural ways of avoiding the worst case.

Gitlin, Todd. *The Intellectuals and the Flag*. Irvington, NY: Columbia University Press. “The tragedy of the left,” writes Tod Gitlin, “is that, having achieved an unprecedented victory in helping to stop an appalling war, it then proceeded to commit suicide.” After Viet Nam it marginalized itself, making virtues of the ennui of the postmodernist mood and the anti-political populism of cultural studies. Without agreeing with all their opinions, Gitlin points to three exemplary intellectuals—David Riesman, C. Wright Mills, and Irving Howe—and he discusses three potential tools useful in the renaissance of the patriotic left intellectual, the media, citizenship, and higher education.

Benson, Rodney and Erik Neveu, editors. *Bourdieu and the Journalistic Field*. Malden, MA: Polity Press. Benson and Neveu have done a great service in bringing together in English a number of articles, published and unpublished, that deal with Pierre Bourdieu’s under-appreciated contributions to the study of the role of journalism in the political and social life of modern societies. In addition to the editors, there are contributions by Patrick Champagne, Dominique Marchette, Julian Duval, Erik Klinenberg, Michael Schudson, and Daniel Hallin. Collectively they give an excellent exposition and critique of Bourdieu’s field theory. Part I of the book opens with his essay: “The Political Field, the Social Science Field, and the Journalistic Field.”

Smilde, David. *Reason To Believe: Cultural Agency in Latin American Evangelism*. Berkeley: University of California Press. Using data from an ethnography of underclass Latin American men, Smilde endeavors to explain the recent rise of Protestant Evangelism. He shows that the sociology of culture perspective of Ann Swidler and Wendy Griswold, the rational choice theory of Rodney Stark and Roger Finke, as well as the substantive rationality of Norman Alexander and Christian Smith fall short in explaining the narratives created by his informants. He finds that a new perspective based in “imaginative rationality” more adequately explains the data.

Carpenter, Laura M. *Virginity: An Intimate Portrait of First Sexual Experiences*. New York: New York University Press. Based on extensive interviews with young straight, gay, and bisexual men and women, Carpenter teases out four distinct frames that people use to construct their own virginity loss. Some see virginity as a gift to a sexual partner given in the context of marriage, while others see it as a stigma, a right of passage, or a way of honoring one’s religious beliefs. She also explores the meaning of virginity for gays and lesbians as well as for “born-again virgins.”

Hawkins, Martin. *A Shot in the Dark: Making Records in Nashville: 1945-1955*. Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press. Nashville likes to call itself “Music City,” and most who hear this think first of country music, but in the first Post Second World War decade, a number of enterprising Nashvillians, making use of the industry infrastructure built largely by companies associated with the Grand Ole Opry, promoted and recorded local music, ranging from dance bands to gospel, from...
country to blues, from rhythm and blues to teen pop and rude country novelty songs. The record companies included Bullet, World, Tennessee, Republic, Speed, and Dot. The most influential radio station that promoted local artists was Clear Channel WLAC.

Denzin, Norman K. and Michael D. Giardina, editors. *Qualitative Inquiry and the Conservative Challenge*. Walnut Creek, CA: Left Coast Press. This volume is a call to qualitative researchers to respond to the prevailing political and methodological conservatism of the time. Twenty-two scholars from five countries and many academic disciplines discuss how qualitative inquiry can forge a forward-looking agenda, its emphasis on ethical practice, and its stance in favor of social justice.

Bennett, Andy, Barry Stark, and Jayson Toynbee, editors. *The Popular Music Studies Reader*. New York: Routledge. Bennett, Stark, and Toynbee have put together a very useful anthology of forty-three articles that view music from quite distinct perspectives. Music is studied as sound, as text—text seen in lyrics, in performance, and in dance, as collaborative performance. It is also seen as a creative scene, as part of everyday life, and through the lens of the music industry, technology, media, gender and sexuality.

Longhurst, Brian. 2007. *Popular Music and Society*. Polity: Cambridge, UK. In this very useful text Brian Longhurst provides a comprehensive view of contemporary popular music as seen in large part from a British perspective. He examines music's role in shaping fan scenes, he sees music as "text" to be read in lyrics, dance, the body language, and political meaning. And he details the workings of the commercial machine that dictates which songs and genres do and do not get wide exposure.

**Princeton University Press's Six**

Boltanski, Luc & Laurent Thévenot. *On Justification: The Economies of Worth*. In a far-reaching discussion, Boltanski and Thévenot argue that an underappreciated dimension of social interaction is the way individuals justify their actions to others, drawing on their experience to appeal to principles they hope will command respect. Individuals, however, often misread situations, and many disagreements can be explained by people appealing, knowingly and unknowingly, to different principles. The authors argue that justifications fall into six main logics exemplified by six authors: civic (Rousseau), market (Adam Smith), industrial (Saint-Simon), domestic (Bossuet), inspiration (Augustine), and fame (Hobbes).

Tilly, Charles. *Why: What Happens when People Give Reasons and Why*. Approaching much the same subject from a perspective reminiscent of Erving Goffman that complements rather than contradicts Boltanski and Thévenot, Tilly suggests that people make four types of justifications for their actions: conventions (socially accepted clichés like “My train was late,” or “We’re otherwise engaged that evening”), stories (simplified cause-effect narratives), legal or religious codes, and technical accounts (often impenetrable to nonspecialists). He argues that our social position in the interaction dictates the kind of reason we invoke in a given circumstance.

Roth, Marie Louise. *Selling Women Short: Gender and Money on Wall Street*. Wall Street is supposed to be run by pure economics, rating performance and compensating employees objectively. However, by comparing the experiences of men and women who began their careers on Wall Street in the late 1990s, Roth finds not only that women earn an average of 29% less, but that they are shunted into less lucrative career paths, are not promoted, and are denied the best clients.

Bowen, John R. *Why the French Don’t like Headscarves: Islam, the State, and Public Space*. The policy is consistent with the French national policy developed in the wake of the French Revolution to suppress all regional and ethnic distinctions in dress, language and custom in the name of equality through citizenship. The issues raised have clear implications for tensions in England, the U.S., and elsewhere.

Rosen, Lawrence. *Law as Culture: An Invitation*. In the face of common disbelief, Rosen argues that facts in court are aduced in much the same way that they are in everyday life. He argues that court procedures help fashion a common sense of relationships in society.

Cowen, Tyler. *Good and Plenty: The Creative Successes of American Arts Funding*. Cowen explores why the U.S.’s way of funding the arts, while largely indirect, results in small amounts of bad art but in plenty of good art. He suggests ways in which funding could be tweaked to result in even more and better art.

**Six from the University of California Press**

Best, Joel. *Flavor of the Month: Why Smart People Fall for Fads*. Best explores range of institutional fads, analyzing the features of our culture that foster them, and identifies the major phases of a fad: emerging, surging, and purging. He deconstructs these as elements of the American notion of reinvention, progress, and perfectability.

Sherman, Rachel. *Class Acts: Service and Inequality in Luxury Hotels*. Based on her extensive ethnographic investigation of luxury hotel staff, Sherman finds that workers employ a number of practices to control interactions with guests, teaching them how to behave in a luxury environment and fostering in them the idea that they deserve the luxuries they receive.

Shauman, Russell Leigh. *The Tenants of East Harlem*. Through the life histories of seven residents whose experience in East Harlem spans almost a century, Sherman combines oral histories with ethnographic observation to show the history of ethnic immigration and class segregation in the inner city.

Smoak, Gregory E. *Ghost Dances and Identity: Prophetic Religion and American Ethnogenesis in the Nineteenth Century*. The spread of the Ghost Dance movement in the 19th century is commonly seen as a metaphor for the death of In-
music. In addition they find that most clubbers have a sophisticated knowledge of drug effects and impose controls on each other’s drug use.

Parfitt, Tudor. Genetics, Mass Media and Identity: A Case Study of the Genetic Research on the Lemba. The oral tradition of Jewish origins long held by the Southern Africa Lemba people is now supported by recent genetic testing. This research has deeply affected the narrative of religious identity of the group and the way the tribe is perceived in the Western world.

Hurrewitiz, Daniel. Bohemian Los Angeles: and the Making of Modern Politics. Hurrewitiz chronicles the vibrant milieu of artists, leftists, and gay men and women in Los Angeles in the first half of the 20th century. He asserts that this hidden corner of LA was where the personal first became political, the nation’s first enduring gay rights movement emerged, and the broad spectrum of what we now call identity politics was fashioned.

Routledge Taylor and Francis Group’s Six

Lloyd, Richard. Neo-Bohemia: Art and Commerce in the Postindustrial City. Lloyd presents a fine-grained ethnographic analysis of Wicker Park, the bohemian neighborhood that has recently flourished in Chicago. Lloyd uses the word, neo-bohemian, because, as he clearly shows, the slacker Gen-Xers, who first began to transform this bleak old slum in the early 1990s, had a decade later turned aspects of their bohemian persona into lucrative businesses ranging from restaurants, bars, music clubs and boutiques to commercial design and ad agencies catering to their newly successful fellow Gen-Xers and the still younger cool set.

Keith, Michael. After the Cosmopolitan? Multicultural Cities and the Future of Racism. Keith observes “the post-industrial city” from afar. He addresses debates in cultural theory and urban studies on the growth of culture industries in the marketing of cities, the nature of social exclusion, violence and the ghetto, and the cross-disciplinary conceptualization of cultural hybridity. Considering how conflicts of race and ethnicity develop, he argues that neither the utopian naiveté evidenced in invocations of cosmopolitan democracy or the pessimism of multicultural hell adequately make sense of the changing nature of contemporary metropolitan life.

White, Rosie. Violent Femmes: Women as Spies. Employing the central trope of fictional women who work as spies, White explores the cultural shifts over the twentieth century in the role of women active in the professional workplace. She asserts that such active/violent women refract ongoing debates that test the limits of femininity.

Hunt, Geoffrey. Ecstasy and Raves. Based on interviews with over 300 clubbers, DJs, and promoters, Hunt and Evans describe their social and ethnic backgrounds, their initial involvements with the scene, their experience with drugs, and their changing tastes in music. They find that the scene is made up of many different social groupings based on social class, gender and ethnicity, but also with length of participation in the scene, choice of drugs, types of dancing, and styles of techno music. In addition they find that most clubbers have a sophisticated knowledge of drug effects and impose controls on each other’s drug use.
Swan Song
"Books of Note" began modestly in the first year of the Culture section when I was putting together the newsletter under the editorship of Vera Zolberg. Initially they were used as a way to fill bits of space in the Newsletter. It quickly became recognized as an effective way of mentioning the wide array of new books beginning to be written on topics of possible interest to culturalists, and the large number of positive comments insured its continuance through the numerous editors over the years. I particularly want to thank Mark Jacobs for his sterling defense the one time I was attacked by an irate author.

Books were never solicited, and most notes were prepared from the promotional material provided by authors or publishers. Over the years, the proportion of notices submitted by authors has increased, and these were always included as long as the book was written in English. It was always a pleasure to be able to tout the strengths or the follies of the books using the words provided in the promotional material. In the early days I attempted bits of wit, but these languished as the Section became more formal and self-serious in its second decade. The only form of editorial comment that has endured is the occasional juxtaposition of books espousing quite different views of the same subject. Preparing BON has become more difficult in recent years, not only because of the sheer volume of works published and the fact that some publishers have given up distributing announcements of their new volumes, but because the quality of descriptions offered by some publishers has deteriorated alarmingly. For example, a year or so ago I noted this tendency and quoted the entire blurb that added no information beyond what was evident from the title and table of contents.

I have always enjoyed writing BON, but think the twentieth anniversary of the first one is as good a time as any to pass along the responsibility. pete/ richard.a.peterson@vanderbilt.edu.

FOR INFORMATION ABOUT ASA MTG. AND POST-ASA MINI-CONFERENCE. . .

Please join us at the American Sociological Association’s 102nd Annual Meeting on August 11-14, 2007, in New York City (Hilton New York and Sheraton New York). “Culture Days” at ASA are August 13-14. Culture Section Reception: Monday August 13, 6.30pm - 8.00pm; Section Business Meeting: Tuesday, August 14, 3:30pm - 4:10pm.

For complete program information, registration and housing. see-- http://www.asanet.org

For a handy listing of the Culture Section sessions, see-- http://www.ibiblio.org/culture/2007sectionsessions.shtml

Please join us as well at--
Culture Section of the American Sociological Association
20th Anniversary Dinner and Mini-Conference on Modeling
August 14-15, 2007, New York City

For more information, see-- http://www.ibiblio.org/culture/miniconf-2007-info.shtml

Please contact Kate Levitt at asaculture-conference@communication.ucsd.edu with any of your questions and concerns regarding mini-conference logistics.

SEE YOU IN NEW YORK!