A Message from the Chair  
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This “message” is in the form of a very brief working paper on the sociology of the culture of time. During this last year, Arne Kalleberg and I co-edited Special Issues for Work and Occupations and the American Behavioral Scientist on “Work and Time,” and Carroll Seron and I are publishing a paper on the “Symbolic Meaning of Professional Time” building on our research about escalation of time norms in the legal profession and the stigmatization of part-time work. Thus I have been asked to create a session at the ASA on “Time and Work.” The following thoughts are offered as triggers for further research or reminders of work to connect to present research.

On Culture and Time

“It’s just a matter of time,” many employers have said, when challenged about the low numbers of employees who are women or who come from minority groups. “Time heals all wounds,” also has been offered as the projected expectation of healing for the grieving. But sociologists of culture and of structure understand that “time” is not an independent actor and has no agency. Yet “time marches on” in that “over time” individuals, like other animals or plants, are born, mature and die.

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From Chicago's Last Garden Spot  
To Philadelphia's White Ghetto  

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Chicago served as one of the first laboratories for early social scientists. For nearly a century, scholars from The University of Chicago have taken to the streets to examine life in urban America. American sociology was born in the city’s dilapidated neighborhoods of crowded tenements and cold-water flats. In 1907, Upton Sinclair’s literary masterpiece The Jungle created a devastating portrait of life in Chicago’s South Side slums and awakened Americans to the hardships faced by immigrant laborers and their families. Yet today, almost 100 years later, the working-class descendants of these immigrants - the white ethnics - who toiled in Chicago’s factories, stockyards, and railroads have received almost no attention from contemporary scholars. Maybe it is because Americans have largely defined themselves as citizens of a classless, meritocratic society, or maybe it is because a disproportionate percentage of Americans see themselves as middle class. Whatever the reasons, scholars have turned a blind eye to examining the lives of more modestly employed urban ethnic whites.

The peculiar difficulties inherent in defining who exactly comprises the working class exacerbates the challenges of chronicling the lives of this segment of American society. Dated categories of blue- and pink-collar work no longer describe the texture of working-class labor, and as a result, more complex and nuanced thinking is needed. Michele Lamont defines working-class men and women as blue-collar and lower-middle class workers with stable employment and high-school diplomas, but not college degrees, “which means that the face severe barriers in access to jobs and other social benefits” (2001:13). Lamont continues, “in a time when the upper middle class is becoming more isolated socially and geographically from other groups,” such isolation fosters a social myopia that makes it increasingly difficult for the college-educated, academics, and policy makers to see how distinctive a working-class understanding of the world is.

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That is all that is certain, because the passage through time is less clear for groups, civilizations, or the development of knowledge.

Indeed, sociologists of all camps have documented how societies mark time, use it as a measure of ephemeral concepts such as commitment and excellence, mark it as a social control device and figure out what other attributes should be associated with it.

The previous chair of our section, Eviatar Zerubavel, is one of the best analysts of how time is conceptually structured, deconstructing such terms as the week, the month and the year. He also notes such taxonomies of time as schedules determined by people in power. Although connected to physical conditions such as the turning of the earth and the moon, time markers are constructed by human beings and they often serve interests of particular individuals or groups. I like to think of time as an ideological and a political category. As there are “gatekeepers of ideas” as Lewis Coser pointed out several decades ago, there are gatekeepers of the meaning of time.

Most people are aware of the power relationships when bosses supervise the use of time, but often the gatekeepers are anonymous or unseen. Sometimes they are ourselves, as players in the workplace as suggested by Michael Burawoy, or less obviously as players in the larger society marked by differentiation based on gender, race and class.

But individually we don’t think in terms of global or national power structures. We think about time individually and personally. Hassled as we all are by obvious pressures created by time gatekeepers in our society, we also feel more generally that time is our enemy, attaching almost human intention to it. Professionals often feel bounded by reminders of time created by the technology of the computer and the clock. In fact we live by the watch on our arm, and are “watched” by clocks lodged in every appliance like stoves and TVs, sending forth their greenish lights even at night in the darkness, telling what time it is. On the other hand, for many “out of work,” retired people, for people isolated in the home, time may drag.

As Mary Douglas observed in *Purity and Danger* (1966), certain concepts carry with them a directive as well as signify content. The concept “dirt,” for example, means more than particles in a place where they can cause harm, ugliness, or distaste. It also expresses an attitude, and further, a remedy. For example, when dirt is under the fingernails it sends a signal, “ugh,” and a prescription, “scrub!” Thus, the measurement of time spent at any activity is not merely an account. It carries a normative directive. “Facetime” for example, is work time that other people observe and the prescription is to work when others can see you. Time may be used as an indicator of a location in the day, or the year in a life cycle; it is also used as a prescriptive to “hurry up.”

Furthermore, time norms are intertwined with norms and meanings wrapped around social roles and statuses such as male and female, northerner and southerner, young and old, skilled and unskilled. Who, when, and where are not only the key concepts for writing a good news story; they are the contextual markers of time boundaries. Often they seem absolute but they are clearly, like all norms, negotiable. If only people have the inclination and the courage.

Let us consider the time boundaries by which we live—by choice or coercion.

In our work-driven society the time that is not allotted to work is what is left to us for other pursuits. It usually has a label, leisure time, personal time, family time. Taking that time may be a sign of defiance, of necessity, or guilty pleasure. Others are watching our work time—in the U.S. we are reared to think that time is precious or and that “time is money”; it is the counting of “billable hours,” the measurement of our productivity within a given time frame such as number of publications we have written in the six years before tenure is determined, or the number of keystrokes recorded on the computers on which we work... Numerous others, peers as well as superiors are evaluating our use of time and applauding or scowling in approval or disapproval. We are admonished to use our time wisely, not fritter it away, incorrectly prioritize it, or let it run out. We face sanctions (positive and negative) in the form of docked or overtime pay, anger or approval of our intimates outside the workplace, and definitions of identity (he or she is a “workaholic, a “goldbrick”).

I am interested in the ways in which social commentators of today evaluate the use of time, assess it in the workplace and in the home, place constraints on who may use it and when. As I suggested above, the performance of ascribed statuses such as gender, age, and race, as well as achieved statuses such as worker, manager, mother and father embody time norms—there’s not much democracy about it. Time norms are therefore are enfolded in ideology.

Let’s consider how time norms are entwined with gender norms. Why, for example, is there, as Arlie Hochschild put it, a “clockwork of a man’s career” and not a clockwork of a woman’s career? If a woman works at a career is it necessarily traveling a male route? Why are these time sequences gendered? The notion of workaholism and overtime work defines masculinity, while men who spend time at childcare are honored if they perform it outside of work time and derided for performing it during work time.” Women who seek some combination of work and family time are placed on the “mommy track”—a slow track with no destination.

The norms ascribed to work and family for women and men are usually time and space norms, which may be imposed by the powerful or the manifestation of a bottom-up ideology. Thus men and women are positioned into what I call “role zones” which are bounded by time norms. The most obvious example of a role zone is the notion that men executives, doctors and lawyers as loyal members of “greedy institutions” are expected make work time their priority 24 hours a day and seven days a week although they may well be married and the fathers of children. Women in the same work roles, however would be considered morally derelict should they fulfill the time norms of a professional.

Of course, time is used more generally as an important component of the social control system. The panoptic gaze weighs most heavily on the people lowest in the social hierarchy, but even top dogs are under surveillance. The news media declare it the nation’s business when a President spends an hour on his treadmill during the work day or engages in social activities at his place of work after the normal work day. It is surprising how much assessments are based on when we work, and how much we work, rather than our productivity and quality of the work. How we spend our time seems to be everybody’s business unless we can engage in subterfuge with such concepts as the “working vacation,” and /or use technological means to cover up the location of where we spend our time.

These are just a few ideas that serve to focus on time as a construct building on a sociological tradition and considering some new elements. Many members of this section have already contributed to the sociology of time. Let me invite others to think about time as an independent construct, the politics of time, and time ideologies, and to think about the consequences for a number of social issues.
The few studies of white, working-class life that do exist (namely Lillian Rubin’s *Worlds of Pain*, David Halle’s *America’s Working Man*, William Kornblum’s *Blue Collar Community*, and Jonathan Rieder’s *Canarsie*) provide portraits of life in the 1960s and 1970s and tend to focus on race relations or shop floor life. Michele Lamont’s *The Dignity of Working Men* and John Hartigan’s *Racial Situations* are the first modern studies of blue-collar Americans to appear in nearly fifteen years.

However, while modern day studies of working-class whites are few and far between, historical accounts of blue-collar urban dwellers abound. Since 1996, historians such as John McGreevey, Gerald Gamm, and Thomas Sugrue have written about the “urban villages” ethnic whites created during the first part of the 20th century. Historians’ interest in the ethnic enclave story mirrors growing public and academic interest in inner-city ghettos and the underclass. To such experts, the form of the modern day ghetto can be directly traced back to the racist interests of working-class whites. According to these scholars, blue-collar white ethnics were more prone to racial violence because they felt they had the most to lose if integration came to pass. From the vantage point of racist working-class whites, the arrival of blacks violated racial norms of conduct, threatened to spread poverty and crime, and meant the demise of precious local institutions such as the parish. Furthermore, ethnic whites’ “peasant” sensibilities concerning the significance of land fueled the white population’s all-consumming drive to achieve the goal of homeownership. From this perspective, the distinctively working-class white desire to own a home, in conjunction with the institutional need of Catholic parishes to maintain strong spatial claims to the community in which a congregation’s members lived, set the stage for racist extremism of the white ethnics.

Even though these historical arguments offer important insights into the development of working-class urban whites’ racist belief systems, for intellectuals and policymakers, it often seems as if ethnic whites have become convenient scapegoats for racism in the same way that the ghetto and its residents are scapegoats for working-class whites’ denial and fear. Such accounts of urban history may offer soothing relief for middle-class white guilt over the state of race relations in the post-industrial city, but these versions of history do little to challenge conventional wisdom about race, racism, and racists.

**In Search of the White Underclass: The Case of Low-Income Single, White Mothers**

As scholarly interest in the urban, white working class waned, attention to racialized notions of the inner city and the underclass flourished. By the late 1970s, public and scholarly discourse on urban life focused almost exclusively on the plight of ghetto neighborhoods. Race, poverty, and the inner city have become inextricably linked in the public consciousness and most Americans assume, albeit incorrectly, that low-income African Americans residing in inner cities make up the overwhelming majority of Americans living in poverty.

In my new project, I seek to redress the scholarly neglect of poor whites in an ongoing collaboration with noted poverty scholar Kathryn Edin. From 1998 to 2001, I did repeated, open-ended interviews and participant observation with 57 low-income single, white mothers living in North and South Philadelphia.

In the neighborhoods where I met these families (the youngest mother was 14-years-old, two women were grandmothers by their mid-thirties, and the oldest mother was 50), drug addicted women sell their bodies at strip clubs and underneath the elevated train tracks. Kids on bikes tout heroin, cocaine, pills and guns. Hollow-eyed kids stare down passersby as they guard rundown corner storefronts and stoops. Every block of family homes filled with children has one dealer providing his or her “services” to the community. Billboards responding to the neighborhood’s ailments advertise their services: “Twenty-four-hour heroin detox,” DNA testing for child support cases, and “sell your home for cash.” Instead of landscaped lawns and manicured grass, dime bags litter the streets, parks, and playgrounds. Memorial murals painted on brick walls honor those who have lost their lives to the streets. Families complain about how the cops “don’t do anything,” and neighbors rely on pit bulls and baseball bats to guard their homes. Young men and women sport a popular T-shirt design that announces their profound disappointment to the world in a parody of the ever-popular college jerseys: “Philadelphia: School of Hard Knocks.” Anyone who has seen the crumbling cores of America’s inner-cities would not find any the things I describe here surprising; what is surprising is that all the neighborhoods are white.

In his now classic study *The Truly Disadvantaged*, William J. Wilson establishes a racialized view of the urban underclass as a subject for academic study and political debate. Wilson argues that extreme poverty areas (zones where the poverty rate stands at 25 percent or more) are prey to the crippling effects of concentrated poverty, declining social institutions, family disruption, and joblessness. Social isolation provides a cultural element to Wilson’s analysis with his contention that “social isolation from mainstream patterns of behavior subjects [underclass] residents to the debilitating social conditions.” On the relationship of poor whites to the ghetto Wilson writes, “Poor whites rarely live in such neighborhoods...only 7 percent of poor whites live in extreme poverty areas, [whereas] 32 percent of all poor Hispanics and 39 percent of all poor blacks live in such areas” (1987:62). Such statistics paint a convincing picture of the racial aspects of inner-city poverty. But what happens when we shift our attentions and ask about the 7 percent of whites who live in such neighborhoods? In Philadelphia, a city that for Wilson epitomizes the emergence of an underclass, poor whites are plentiful (92,000 in 1990).

In this new research, I want to highlight the “outlier” case of poor, urban whites primarily because they disrupt “common-sense” assumptions about the inner-city, poverty, and race. Just as cultural critics and social activists tirelessly remind us the typical welfare recipient is white not black, so too the crumbling areas of the inner-city are not uniformly inhabited by African Americans.

Taken-for-granted assumptions about whiteness, racial privilege and respectability come apart at the seams in my interviews and fieldwork when I see how being “decent” and “respectable” cannot be secured through white privilege. One of the most fascinating elements of the project has to do with white women caring for mixed race children. The struggles of low-income white women raising children who are not white provides powerful evidence of white privilege’s intangible advantages and the costs incurred when it is lost. White mothers raising (white) children in stable white working-class neighborhoods accrue distinct privileges for their children compared to their “underclass” minority counterparts. Scholars from Wilson to Massey and Denton have painstakingly chronicled how segregation, declining social institutions, and concentrated poverty have devastated black, inner-city communities and families in particular.

However, when white women living on the margins of these two worlds - white working-class “enclave” and “ghetto” – enter into relationships with non-white partners they regularly choose (or are forced) to raise their children in minority areas when they follow the father of their children into his home community or because the
racist attitudes of their white neighbors forces them out of better "white" neighborhoods. In such cases, it becomes possible to observe how the day-to-day advantages of white privilege fall away for these families. Not only do these white mothers find themselves geographically cut off from more stable and more resource rich white communities, they also find themselves separated from family and friends who might assist them in the care of their children. In addition, these white mothers also stand out as "a minority" in communities faced with severely depleted social, economic, and political resources. In a striking irony, such mothers may be forced to deal with racism (on behalf of their children or for themselves) for the first time in their lives. White privilege, which once protected them from discrimination, now leaves them ill-equipped to deal with racism. Anthropologist France Winddance Twine describes these white women caring for and nurturing their non-white children as "transracial" mothers. In a sense, these women are racial pioneers in this no-man's land separating dated and monolithic notions of "whiteness" and "colored" and "urban village" and "ghetto." More importantly, these transracial mothers offer a provocative challenge to assumptions about white privilege, class, community, and the very notion of motherhood.

**Chicago’s Last Garden**

My research on the low-income whites and my search for a white urban underclass work in Philadelphia grew out of my dissertation research, a five-year community study of a stable, white working-class neighborhood located on the city’s Southwest Side. This research is reported in my book, *Working-Class Heroes: Protecting Home, Community, and Nation in a Chicago Neighborhood*, forthcoming from the University of California Press. At the heart of this unapologetically Chicago School ethnography is the desire to give a voice to a segment of the population we know very little about beyond the media accounts of bussing and desegregation throughout the 1960s and 1970s.

The inhabitants of Beltway, a working-class neighborhood located on Chicago’s Southwest Side, are an engaging, straightforward, generous, boisterous, open, patriotic, warm and trusting lot. At other times, they can be angry, resentful, jealous, insecure, bigoted, ignorant, and downright petty. What many people might find most surprising is that Beltwayites do not explicitly teach their children to hate others because of a person’s skin color. They believe in the ideals of justice, liberty, and fair play. More than any other segment of American society, they see purity and truth in the promise of the American Dream. My purpose in telling the story of one Chicago neighborhood is to show how race relations have evolved since the civil rights era, and how complex views of race define residents’ distinctive sense of place. As ethnographer, interviewer, and scholar, I am the reader’s guide into the world Beltway dwellers labor to create. This work should leave the reader with an understanding of how the people I describe make sense of the world. The sociologist Gerald Suttles describes working-class neighborhoods like Beltway as defended neighborhoods, in other words, local areas threatened by social or ecological change. In previous ethnographic accounts (notably Jonathan’s Rieder’s impressive study of working- and lower-middle-class Jews and Italians in Canarsie), scholars have painstakingly documented working-class urban whites’ terror when faced with the prospect of neighborhood turnover. On one level, the story of Chicago’s Beltway during the 1990s, continues where Rieder’s story of Brooklyn’s Canarsie of the 1970s and 1980s leaves off. Neither place has stood frozen in time. While Rieder chronicles how local activists work to keep out poor blacks, my portrait of neighborhood life in Beltway demonstrates what residents want to defend, and most importantly, what they would mourn the loss of if the neighborhood ceased to exist. This work explores how the neighborhood symbolizes everything its working-class residents value - hard work, honesty, patriotism, and respectability - and that
white. The Alderman explains, “There are areas of the city that are changing with high crime rates or the neighborhoods are changing, so to speak, and people are moving either to the Southwest or Northwest Side if they have to stay in the city.” In the Alderman’s carefully worded description of the Southwest Side, “changing” and “bastions of stability” are loaded terms, code words for the dichotomy of the Haves (or at least the Have-A-Little-Mores) and Have-Nots, the racial divide between white and black, decent and ghetto.

But besides the “last stand,” Beltway dwellers have other ways of talking about their corner of Chicago. Residents regularly describe the neighborhood as “beautiful,” “a utopia,” and most evocatively, “the last garden spot in Chicago.” Beltway residents do not mind the smells from the factories, the noise from the airport, or the snot that seems to cover everything. As I heard residents proclaim that their neighborhood - this place - is beautiful, I tried to see Beltway from the viewpoint of its full-time inhabitants. I took note of the elaborate lawn decorations, manicured grass, color-coordinated kitchens, fastidiously cared for American-made cars, flags flying on the Fourth of July, and graffiti-free alleys and streets. Such displays require the solicitous care of local activists and property owners. The people of Beltway willingly dedicate themselves to the care of the neighborhood landscape with an unquestioned, nearly spiritual devotion.

Most people have heard of the famous monikers for Chicago such as the line from writer Carl Sandburg, “the city of broad shoulders” or “the windy city,” a reference to Chicago’s colorful political history. Yet, the city known for the great fire of 1871 and its stockyards and meat-packing industry has as its official motto “Urbs in Horto” which, translated from Latin, means “City in a Garden.” Lifelong Southwest Sider Congressman William Lipinski regularly describes the city neighborhoods of his district as “the last garden spot in Chicago.” Congressman Lipinski explains he did not coin the expression himself, “actually it was a fellow by the name of Joe Baraka who was a barber on Archer Avenue.” The garden could refer to local residents’ devotion to landscaping and gardening. Civic groups such as the Midway Garden Club and the neighborhood civic league along with the Beltway branch of the Chicago Public Library regularly sponsor activities for local gardeners. Events range from discussions about roses and vegetable gardens to presentations on how to create compost heaps within the environs of the city. Neighbors take great pleasure in showing off their magnificent (if sometimes over-the-top) landscaping efforts.

The notion of the garden also exists on the mythic level of the Garden of Eden. A garden is a place of cultivated order and abundance and, without question, the two things the residents of Beltway want most to cultivate in their lives are order and abundance. Beltway symbolizes an Edenic refuge from the uncertainty and chaos whirling about its working-and lower-middle-class inhabitants. The people of Beltway define and defend their place and identity in American society in the face of the growing threat to their way of life and achievements posed by their physical and social proximity to the ghetto. In the world garden dwellers inhabit, chaos takes a multitude of forms: the ghetto, crime, poverty, abandoned buildings, graffiti, filth, unsupervised kids, gangs, and economic uncertainty. The manicured lawns, cookie-cutter houses, and clean streets transform the neighborhood’s visual landscape into an oasis of order. Residents’ extreme attention to cleanliness perpetuates order. The bungalow-style housing - clean, boxy, brick, the orderliness of the furnishings, and the high standard for keeping house - all the ritualistic displays of housepride become declarations of stability and decency, particularly among women. The primordial hunger for order grows out of human beings’ endeavors to make sense and meaning out of the world, for radical separation from order and meaning constitutes a fundamental threat to the individual.

Beltway, as a place of abundance, comes to life through the dazzling displays of hospitality and consumption. At family functions such as weddings or graduation parties, food is customarily served “family style” which means massive platters are passed around so the guests may have a choice of three or four entrees. Guests may select from a variety of popular staples including mostaciolli with meat sauce, roast pork, chicken, potatoes, dumplings (or pierogies soaked in butter), and boiled vegetables drenched in mayonnaise dressing. For dessert kolackis, strudels, bundt cakes, cheesecakes, fruit-filled gelatin molds, fruit ambrosia, and pies will be crammed on to every free inch of table and counter space. The displays of abundance also come to life in Beltway residents’ consumption of cars, houses, furniture, and even the way their kids are dressed. Indeed, the inhabitants of Beltway do not simply use their possessions, they care for and display material goods with a nearly religious veneration. In this world, consumption is no passive, empty activity. On the contrary, among the residents of the last garden, consumption represents a serious symbolic and cultural endeavor. In the search for home and the good life, the people of Beltway cultivate order and abundance through a devout belief in the last garden. The working-class residents of Beltway labor to transform empty physical space into a symbolically significant place that reinforces and reproduces the values of its working-class inhabitants. A place is not simply discovered, people construct it as a practical activity. Sociologists John Logan and Harvey Molotch write: “Place itself is a social construction ... We do not dispose of place after it is bought and used.” A place “holds a particular preciousness to its users, even when compared to other items, such as food, place is still distinctive” (1987:100). In a fragile and uncertain world, the collective community-level cultivation of the last garden becomes a philosophy about the meaning of home and the good life.

Beltway is the type of community (and there are a number of others throughout the country such as Philadelphia’s Northeast, Milwaukee’s South Side neighborhoods, Hyde Park and the old Irish and Italian sections of Boston’s Brighton, and New York City’s Floral Park) that our usual image of inner city ghettos and gentrifying neighborhoods misses. In Beltway there is a story about the nature of working-class life, about a particular kind of urbanism, a segment of the working class that did not join the rush to the suburbs, how “being American” exists on the level of neighborhood and home, and how the pursuit of happiness is elevated to a patriotic duty.

ENDNOTE

Some sections of this article are excerpted from chapter 1 of my forthcoming book, Working Class Heroes: Protecting Home, Community, and Nation in a Chicago Neighborhood. They appear by courtesy of the University of California Press.

REFERENCES


"Cultural Repertoires": Report on Joint Session of Sociology of Culture and Comparative and Historical Sociology Sections, 2001 ASA Meetings

The Study of Boundaries in Comparative-Historical and Cultural Sociology

Michèle Lamont, Princeton University

In the fall of 2000 I was invited to organize sessions for the 2001 ASA meetings by both Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, Chair of the Culture Section, and Charles Ragin, Chair of the Comparative Historical Section. The topic of each session was open, and after consultation with Charles, we agreed to co-organize a session on the topic of “Theoretical and Methodological Implications of ‘Cultural Repertoires’ (CR).” The Council of the Comparative Historical section thought the session would be of interest to the section, and so we offer a summary of the papers in this edition of this newsletter.

These offer a glimpse of important ongoing debates that are leading sociologists to refine our understanding of the notion of cultural structure (Sewell 1992), the causal role of culture, and culture’s relationship to a notion of “hard social structure.” These “sketches of papers” may help us continue to rethink some of the key theoretical issues that are shared by cultural sociologists and comparative historical sociologists. They are offered here as “food for thought” in anticipation of a more sustained explicit exchange across the two fields.

Why choose “cultural repertoires” (CR) as the focus of a “joint-sections-session”? Simply because this notion plays a key role in the research currently conducted in cultural sociology and comparative historical sociology — two fields whose ASA sections membership overlap substantially. While in cultural sociology, the concept is mostly associated with Ann Swidler’s path-breaking 1986 article “Culture in Action,” in comparative historical sociology it has been popularized primarily by the writings of Charles Tilly on “repertoires of contention” (e.g., Tilly 1993). Both fields have also witnessed the emergence of theoretical tools that share a “family resemblance” with the notion of repertoire. For instance, following the work of David Snow and his collaborators (see Benford and Snow 2000), sociologists are extending the application of frame analysis to capture the differently structured frameworks used across a range of issues in a variety of national and historical contexts. Similarly, in a more phenomenological vein, neo-institutionalists have focused on widely available accounts used to capture the construction of personhood and rationality across settings. Somers and Gibson (1994), among others, have made the concept of “narrative” — with its supra-individual connotation — more salient in ongoing scholarship on identity. In France, Boltanski and Thévenot (1991) have proposed an analysis of “orders of justification” that people deploy to assess whether an action benefits the common good. They distinguish a plurality of “orders of justification” that people deploy to assess whether an action benefits the common good. They distinguish a plurality of “orders of justification” that people deploy to assess whether an action benefits the common good. They distinguish a plurality of “orders of justification” that people deploy to assess whether an action benefits the common good. They distinguish a plurality of “orders of justification” that people deploy to assess whether an action benefits the common good.

While Swidler has been particularly concerned with the tools available, I have been more concerned with analyzing what tools groups are more likely to use given the structural situation in which they find themselves (Lamont 1992, p. 135). Finally, in my collaborative work with Laurent Thévenot, we show that elementary grammars or schemas are unevenly present across national cultural repertoires (Lamont and Thévenot 2000). We find that certain tools are more readily available in France than in the United States, with the result that members of these communities do not give the same symbolic weight to particular distinctions. By using theoretical tools developed by cultural sociologists over the last twenty years, including that of cultural repertoires, we move beyond the psychologism, naturalism, and essentialism that characterized much of the comparative cultural analysis tradition, from Ferdinand Toennies to Talcott Parsons, Francis Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington.

REFERENCES


Cultural Repertoires and Cultural Logics: Can They Be Reconciled?

Ann Swidler, University of California, Berkeley

This paper asks whether we can reconcile ideas of culture as embodying some internal “logic” and the idea that culture works like a tool kit or repertoire—with many parts among which people pick and choose. It argues that the relations of repertoires and logics emerge more clearly when we see how culture works differently at different levels and locations in social organization.

First, if we look at culture by trying to understand what is in individuals’ heads, we discover that people “know” much more culture than they use. Second, individuals sustain a lot of unconnected...
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sometimes contradictory, or simply uncoordinated cultural stuff in their repertoires. People make selections from their repertoire based on problems of action. Because they face many different kinds of problems with differing structures, they keep on tap multiple, sometimes discordant, skills, capacities, and habits.

Collectivities also have wide repertoires of cultural materials available. Like a library that holds more books than any one person could ever read, a “culture” contains an array of resources that people can draw on in different ways. Scholars such as Lamont and Thévenot and their collaborators (Lamont and Thévenot 2000) demonstrate that there are diverse “repertoires of evaluation” in the United States and France, so that differences between the two national cultures are best seen as different emphases and selections from repertoires with many overlapping possibilities.

**Cultural Logics**

If there are repertoires of diverse cultural possibilities at both the individual and the collective levels, then what happens to the idea of cultural logics? Is the very idea of culture useful if it does not imply some sort of patterned logic, rather than just a hodge-podge of symbols and meanings? William Sewell, Jr. (1999) has suggested that concrete cultures—the actual collection of meanings, schemas, beliefs, and symbols with which a people live—may be quite incoherent. But analytically understood, because culture is a semiotic system for creating or conveying meaning, it is necessarily unified. Particular messages, images, or ideas would make no sense unless there were a coherent code against which they could be decoded or understood. Recognition that in its analytic aspect culture presumes some unified logic does not, however, suggest what the principles of that logic might be.

**Institutional Logics**

If cultural logics come in many forms (deductive, binary, or narrative, for example), we are forced to think about whether the concept of a cultural logic is useful at all. I believe it is, if we ask what might generate and reproduce diverse logics, which would nonetheless have constraining power. One source of systematic cultural logics is institutions. Institutions “induce” cultural logics, as culture helps actors bridge the gaps institutions leave. In Talk of Love (2001), I show that dominant understandings of love help people navigate dilemmas of action created by the institution of marriage (and by non-marriage relationships patterned on marriage). Romantic Love describes the all-or-nothing, exclusive, life-transforming, and enduring experience that corresponds to the institutional structure of marriage. Prosaic-Realistic Love delineates the gradually-developing, uncertain, continually-renegotiated, intimate experience of an ongoing marriage relationship.

These two logics of the culture of love demonstrate three points about the relation between institutions, cultural repertoires, and cultural logics. 1) First, culture and institutions are “reciprocal” not homologous. The culture that organizes individual action emerges in the gaps institutions leave. Thus when courtship is a matter of individual initiative, while marriage is strongly institutionalized, “love” is about courtship (the all-or-nothing decision about whether and whom to marry), while marriage itself is little elaborated culturally. When marriage becomes more problematic, as in our era, then the marriage relationship is culturally elaborated (with a prosaic-realistic culture about communication, compromise, and commitment), because staying married is a major problem for people. Institutions set the problems actors solve, and culture organizes those solutions. 2) Second, since there are many possible ways to negotiate the gaps institutions create, there are often rich repertoires of alternative cultural meanings. 3) Third, where people confront similar institutional dilemmas, their cultural repertoires will consist of varying solutions to similarly structured problems, and the various solutions will have a consistent “logic”—not a psychological logic, but an institutional one.

Orders of Disorder: Where Logics and Institutions Intersect

The view of culture as related to institutional logics (see the very similar position of Friedland and Alford 1991) raises the larger question of whether and how differing institutional logics intersect or remain distinctive. But addressing this question—that of the coherence and incoherence of cultures at larger global and societal levels—requires making distinctions among a variety of things we lump under the term “culture” (see Jepperson and Swidler 1994).

**Semiotic Codes**

In addition to inducing “lines of action” and the culture that organizes them, institutions “entail” certain sorts of cultural accompaniments (see D’Andrade 1984). Primary among these are the “semiotic codes” that accompany institutional arrangements and allow people in a given community to communicate (and negotiate) their position with respect to that institution. For example, engagement and wedding rings, for those who know the code, signal marital status. While, in this example, the code depends on the institution (without marriage, wedding and engagement rings couldn’t mean what they do), the code can change independently of the institution. For example, the use of Miss and Mrs. to distinguish unmarried from married women has given way to “Ms.” without a corresponding elimination of the institutional significance of marriage.

Such semiotic codes (for example, the elaborate mourning customs Jane Collier [1997] found among Spanish villagers in which the burdensomeness of mourning signaled both the importance of the person who had died and the closeness of the mourner’s relationship) have a powerful logic of a coherent signaling system: one cannot simply change one element without wrecking the code; and people find themselves constrained by the code whether they “believe” in it or not. Such codes are not a repertoire from which actors can pick and choose, but are like a language: you have to follow the rules if you want to be understood, and sometimes even inadvertent deviations from the code will be “misunderstood.”

**Institution-Generating Logics**

As Frank Dobbin (1994) has argued, national societies often seem to have favored models for solving social and political problems, applied across varied arenas. Thus, Dobbin notes, the French favor state initiative in response to many social and economic problems, while Americans favor “free market” solutions, and the British prefer to preserve the autonomy independent entrepreneurs. Dobbin argues that such models arise from the national experience of creating political order, generalized to provide an account of the sources of economic progress and social order. Here we find cultural logics that are generalized beyond particular institutional spheres and that seem to have a compelling logic of their own.

There are three distinguishable cultural processes at work here, which operate in somewhat different ways. These are “authoritative public models,” “widely available habits,” and “collective action schemes.” In this summary, I will discuss only collective action schemas, such as American voluntarist associationalism. Charles Tilly, William Sewell, Jr. and Sidney Tarrow, among others, analyze repertoires of collective action schemas. Such repertoires are genuinely collective in that they consist of the modes by which collective action can be organized in a given community. Such schemas, while they may be stored in part in the consciousness of individuals, operate as widely understood, shared templates. Thus they are publicly enacted on ritual occasions, described in widely disseminated myths, and broadly shared, at least in the sense that everyone knows that everyone else knows them.

I argue in Talk of Love that such models of collective action change infrequently (not necessarily slowly—indeed, they may change quite abruptly when collective crises allow everyone to see at once that everyone has seen that the king doesn’t rule anymore, that powerful leaders can be deposed, or that “people power” can work). But even such collective action schemas—which need public
validation, or at least the collusive knowledge that “everyone knows” that “everyone knows” that things can be done this way—can be part of a larger repertoire. Indeed, Sewell (1990) writes of France during the period from the Revolution to 1848 when the old corporate forms of collective action remained dominant because the French state suppressed the newer associationist forms that had emerged during the Revolution.

American “voluntarism” is the set of ideas and practices according to which people with common interests form social groups by joining together voluntarily to act on those interests. Varennne (1977) sees voluntarist individualism as a generalized cultural code that Americans use to constitute group life in all arenas, from family, to government, to religion. But he misses the point that while voluntarist individualism provides a mythic way of understanding what social relationships are about, Americans lead most of their lives—from their employment relations, to their family relations, to the bureaucratic authority that governs much of their day-to-day experience—in organizations that are not voluntarist associations at all.

The persistence and the mythic power of the voluntarist imagery come from its distinctive role as the fall-back or “default option” for collective action in America. This means that it has to be shared—there is no point in invoking a form of collective action that isn’t collectively understood. It is enduring—because it can change only in public ritual moments when everyone can see that everyone else can see that everything has changed (see Sewell 1996 on “events”); and it is rehearsed frequently in the form of public myths, rituals, and narratives—because even when it is used infrequently, people need to be familiar with it, to have it on hand.

In summary, distinguishing when culture has its own coherent “logic,” and when it operates like a repertoire of diverse, disconnected possibilities requires analyzing the different kinds of culture that operate at different levels of social organization.

ENDNOTES

1. When the same, apparently “unrealistic” ideas continually recur, our temptation is to blame advertising, or television, or some mysterious process of “hegemony.” But to paraphrase Marx, the problem is not false consciousness, but true consciousness of false institutions. Even cultural meanings people think they have rejected, such as the belief in romantic love, continually recur in their thinking as long as the same institutions set the problems they have to solve.

2. See the remarkably similar formulation in Michael Suk-Young Chwe’s Rational Ritual (2001).

Cultural Repertoires and the Practices of Collective Identity

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What is the value of “cultural repertoires” (CR) for analyzing middle-range meaning-making processes, specifically in the case of collective identity formation in social movements? Alternate approaches to middle-range meaning-making process cannot be generalized beyond broadly diffused or media-saturated processes, and thus cannot tap meaning-making on the middle range. The cultural repertoires (CR) approach is particularly useful where cultural work is diffuse but not widely dispersed, and where public projection of media images does occur but the cultural work itself is not actually situated in, or carried out for, mass media consumption. In these cases CRs have great analytic promise, and they are tools for which there is a present need. An analytic emphasis on institutionalized practice rather than action broadens the range of activity that should be attended to in understanding the construction of meaning and offers a way to examine individual and collective identity in a politicized context. Rather than privileging narrative, dialogue, or structure, I suggest a perspective that admits a less deterministic relationship by which ideational elements impinge on the creation and change of meaning.

An approach that locates culture in practices as well as in systems of meaning requires increased attention to specific institutions and to institutional fields in order to fulfill its promise in the analysis of collective identity formation and political meaning. This approach affords four key insights:

- The salience of a collective identity emerges in practice.
- The emergence of this collective identity is not deterministic.
- Meanings are situated and made concrete.
- The semantics as well as the syntax of meaning production are made clear.

References


At any time and place the constellation of identity relations and representations is the outcome of the practiced negotiation of social spaces and the reciprocal defining processes of other social actors. Collective identity is variable. Prior to mobilization it may stand more or less autonomous of issues of resources and power relations. In the process of organization and mobilization that autonomy will be limited as the links between particular collective identity and organized social movement carriers are crystallized. Just as collective identity is unavoidably bound up in social structure and power, so are its attendant CRs.

Institutions are the ground on which the figure of the collective identity is visible. Yet to see the dimensions of collective identity against an institution one must examine them in both a concrete sense of their exteriority, and in a Durkheimian sense of their facticity.

On the first point, as Arthur Stinchcombe (1997) emphasizes, the influences of institutions do not take place only through disembodied logics and invisible hands. Agents of institutional action are often persons pursuing specific agendas (with greater or lesser degrees of success, of course). As the studies I reference demonstrate, an actor's access to and privilege with certain CRs is variable, chiefly with institutions' exteriority.

On the second point, institutions make demands on actors and provide incentives for their fulfillment. Institutions make practices intelligible and as such provide the most basic of public goods. Furthermore, institutions also structure action so that other public goods are provided in cases of mixed incentive structures. Institutions are served in the context of relations of reciprocity and obligations, as indicated by the deep cultural resonance of the concepts of "stewardship" and "custodianship." In cultural analysis, practitioners should be attentive to the ways persons orient toward serving institutions, and in so doing serve their long term interests. Moreover, this relationship is reinforced in the short run by the distribution of prestige, which can be understood in examples I discuss below in terms of being a "good" mother or woman, a "legitimate" organizer, or a "righteous" clergyman.

Thirdly, institutions are concrete arenas for the negotiation of collective identity, and the availability of CRs depends on historical and institutional conditions. Elisabeth Clemens (1996) finds that in the early American labor movement organizational tools in the CR were differentially available to social actors on the basis of whether they were "appropriate," whether practical knowledge was available, and what "clusters of institutions" exerted control over those tools (Clemens 1996, pp. 208-209).

In addition, institutions distribute social prestige and may legitimize or delegitimize collective identities. Recall that Kristen Luker (1984) finds that acceptance of abortion on demand implies repudiation of costly choices already made by women in the political camp opposed to abortion rights. The strength of these abortion opponents' investment in these life choices explains the strength of their mobilization against abortion rights. The institution involved in this struggle—motherhood—distributes the prestige of being a "good" woman as exhibited in practices of child rearing and attendant choices for career and life path. Luker surmises that as they were entering professional career trajectories her pro-choice participants found new patterns of association that were important to recognize common experiences and were thus the bases on which to assert a new collective identity and challenge the politics of the institution of motherhood. In short, the choices of enacting different sets from the CR of motherhood carried different valences for Luker's participants, and these valences varied with the life choices they had already made.

Finally, access to various cultural repertoires in collective identity work varies with local institutional practices. I found that clergy exposed to the anti-Vietnam war movement in different locations had different repertoires of action legitimately available to them because of their locally variable institutional locations. They chose different courses of action depending on the institutional configurations in which they worked. These clergy made choices for their futures in terms of their institutional positions, choices that they articulate in terms of their loyalties and their commitment to the goals of their work and the risks they therefore tried to mitigate (McLean 2000).

As Clemens notes, the "conceptual abyss between movements and politics may be bridged" by "multiple more or less bounded, more or less compatible organizational fields" (Clemens 1996, p. 213). Yet those organizational fields should be understood to be affected by more or less bounded, more or less compatible institutional fields that order the potential set of meanings and desirable outcomes for the practice of meaning-making actors.

Clemens' conceptual abyss requires a cultural bridge. Indeed, meaning-making processes depend on the history and configuration of those fields, the course of unpredictable historical events, and the outcomes of mobilization processes that may or may not be contested. In those processes discursive, institutional, and organizational fields are subject to change and modification, as new collective identities mark actors' success in making legitimate techniques deployed from the 'cultural repertoire.'

REFERENCES

Convergences and Cleavages in the Study of Cultural Repertoires: Theorizing the Inner Structure of Tool-kits, Symbolic Boundaries and Regimes of Justification
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1. Imported from the world of the performing arts, the idea of cultural repertoires has important theoretical advantages and is now successfully competing with previous key metaphors in the study of culture (such as cultural systems, cultural codes, or culture-as-text). Most important, perhaps, it is useful in conveying the image of a structure that is both enabling and constraining; limiting but also flexible; and relatively stable yet never utterly static or closed—thus also very much in line with the processual and dialectical thrust of current approaches to the notion of structure (Giddens 1984; Sewell 1992). Closely related, it has also proven distinctively attuned to the increasing interest in culture-in-action—also loosely designed as the turn to practice—that has been a central feature of sociological (and anthropological) theory since the 1980's (Ortner 1986).
As such, however, cultural repertoire theory has been less conducive to, and may even be said to have obstructed, the advancement of forms of cultural analysis capable of targeting the inner structure of cultural formations. Close reading of three bodies of work that have much contributed to promote the notion of cultural repertoire will be used here as a way of bringing into relief the tension between a theoretical stress on culture as practice and a growing interest in more systematically mapping out the inner structures of cultural repertoires. More specifically, I submit, we may see a move from a largely unstructured approach in Ann Swidler’s seminal work on cultural tool-kits (1986), through a two-tiered model in Michèle Lamont’s comparative research on symbolic boundaries and national cultural repertoires (1992), to a stronger search for structure in Swidler’s more recent ideas on anchoring cultural practices (2001) and in the context of studies associated with Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot’s new French pragmatic sociology (1991; 1999).1

2. The starting point here is Swidler’s suggestive image of the tool-kit (tightly intertwined with that of repertoire), i.e. her view of culture’s causal significance not in defining ends of action, but in providing the components, or tools used to construct strategies of action (Swidler 1986). Cultural tool-kits, in this early statement, remain largely unstructured entities: Swidler does not introduce any internal distinctions, nor any principle of internal organization that may have helped us, or the actors, to put some order within their respective tool-kits.

Significantly, Swidler has recently started to correct for the lack of internal structuring of culture in her initial conception, which she also identifies as a problematic feature of theories of practices more generally (see Swidler 2001).2 The important task now, as she sees it, is to try and establish some sort of hierarchy among cultural practices, and explore which cultural practices organize, anchor or constrain others; most likely to be central, moreover, are practices that enact constitutive rules that define fundamental social entities, thus also anchoring whole larger domains of practice and discourse; but also, clearly enough, bringing us far from our initial impression of cultural repertoires as largely unstructured tool-kits.

3. Mobilizing systematic comparative research in France and the United States, Lamont introduces the idea of national cultural repertoires as a way of referring mainly to broad, influential intellectual, religious and political historical currents or traditions that provide individuals with readily usable cultural notions that can then be mobilized in boundary work and thus help explain their choice of boundary criteria of “worthiness.” Emerging thus from her approach, in contrast, is a stratified, at least two-layered cultural structure, that distinguishes between remote, macro-cultural repertoires and proximate, usable cultural “tool-kits,” the first providing and even shaping the symbolic contents, or resources entailed in the latter. Traces of elemental structure also emerge with regard to the relation among boundary criteria themselves, their varying tendency to combine or remain autonomous from each other. Yet even in this two-tiered approach, cultural repertoires still remain rather loose symbolic-ideological aggregates, governed by no internal logic or principle, no specific form of structural or systemic relation nor identifiable symbolic dynamics.

4. A more active interest in the internal structures of cultural repertoires is definitely at work in the framework of Boltanski and Thévenot’s new pragmatic sociology. Individual actors, in their perspective, are endowed with an essential competence for evaluation and criticism, and by a flexible capacity to switch codes from one situation to another. Yet they can only choose from, and tend to rely upon, the ultimately limited pool of alternative regimes of criticism and justification that happen to have been made available to them, historically, in what we may well call their cultural repertoire or even cultural “tool-kit.”3 Each regime of justification has its own distinctive internal logic, methodically analyzed along some thirteen parameters of analysis. Moreover, the relation between the alternative regimes of justification is seen as one of constant, principled tension and contradiction within one same repertoire—rather than just a situation of chaos or total absence of structure. Last, pragmatic sociology distinguishes and tries to bridge between at least two, perhaps even three levels of analysis: principles of evaluation as used in day to day life; textual philosophical traditions; and managerialist literature—a sort of third, intermediate level of cultural articulation between that of “popular” common-sense and that of rigorous, high-brow philosophies. Whatever the weaknesses and unresolved dilemmas in this approach, it does have the merit of trying to introduce some form of order in a cultural “tool-kit” or repertoire that other theorists, as we saw, have yet tended to leave largely or only weakly unstructured.

5. By and large, however, there seems to remain a built-in, perhaps unavoidable theoretical tension between stressing plurality and flexibility in the conceptualization of cultural repertoires on the one hand and trying also to endow these very same loose, flexible entities with any form or principle of internal structure on the other. One way of contributing to resolve that tension, I wish to submit, is to build upon an aspect of Swidler’s early 1986 article—namely, her stance of principled opposition to any unitary, ontological theory of culture—that I find no less provocative than her influential image of the tool-kit, and yet has been left largely unheeded. Very briefly, Swidler’s argument is that the relation between culture and social action, and culture and social structure are said to “vary across time and historical situations,” and there is no one way of theorizing them. In this regard, she mainly proposed to distinguish between two major types of situations at least: culture as it operates in “settled” vs. “unsettled” lifeworlds or situations—locating thus the source of the distinction, as it were, “outside” of culture, in the impact of situational, historical contingencies.

Pushing this argument one step further, culture may not always have the same internal structure, may not always be made up of the same type of building blocks, components or clusters, and may not always entail the same form of relations, or linkages between its various components. The task then becomes to labor at demarcating coexisting levels, aspects or domains of culture without prejudging in any ways or theorizing in only one way the relation or mode of interaction between these various levels among themselves and as they affect social action and social structure—leaving such issues rather to the empirical investigation of specific cases and contexts. Such a stance, to my mind, has the advantage of being still highly compatible with the idea of cultural repertoires and its overall “pluralistic,” and practical temper, while also combining it with aspects of the more traditional phenomenological and interpretative sociological projects that have still been left largely unheeded and are still very much part of the tool-kit available to us in promoting new forms of comparative cultural sociology.

ENDNOTES

1 This includes Lamont’s new publication with Laurent Thévenot of the collection of essays comparing repertoires of evaluation in France and the United States (2001) and Boltanski’s recent co-authoring with Eve Chiapello of Le Nouvel Esprit du Capitalisme (1999). A more comprehensive discussion of developments in that field should also include Charles Tilly’s ideas of repertoires of contention and the rich body of historical sociological studies that these have influenced (see Traugott ed., 1995). Far from being limited to the body of research considered here, moreover, the notion of repertoire has now filtered into multiple domains of enquiry and not necessarily in full adherence to any of its initial theoretical formulations.

2 This search for structure is also clearly at work, and even seems to expand and diversify, in Ann Swidler’s new Talk of Love (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2001).

3 While Boltanski and Thévenot themselves never use precisely these words, the kinship of conception is further confirmed, among else, in Lamont and Thévenot (2001). As it stands now, six main
regimes of justification (also called “cités”) have been hitherto mapped out by Boltanski and Thévenot in their collaborative De la Justification: Economies de la grandeur (1991).” The list is not presented as conclusive, and Boltanski has now traced the emergence of a seventh, “project-oriented” cité in his collaborative volume with Eve Chiappello on Le nouvel esprit du capitalisme (1999). The pragmatic program has also identified three main regimes of action—conflict; all-loving, solidary agape; violence (Boltanski 1991), to which has been recently added a regime of “familiarity” (Thévenot 1998).

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"Cultural Repertoire" in a Structuration Process: Theoretical and Research Implications

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I propose here the conceptualization of a “cultural repertoire” (CR) as an integral element of the structuration process. So conceived, I argue, it should be treated as both a structure and a constitutive component of human agency. Such conceptualization contributes to the sociology of culture and comparative-historical sociology in two ways: it resolves the dualism of macro- and micro-analysis and it historicizes (or, sets in motion) cultural repertoires. By conceiving of CRs as processes rather than as static phenomena it sets them in motion historically, thus bridging the gap between a static view of culture and a comparative-historical view of culture. This insight is translated in the paper by examining the implications in terms of research on migrant workers from Poland in Germany. The complex texture of the orientations and coping strategies of undocumented migrant workers (Arbeitstouristen) from postcommunist Poland that is discussed in the forty page paper cannot be adequately summarized here (Morawska, forthcoming). However, a brief presentation of the Methodology, theory and method will be attempted. Implications of the treatment of cultural repertoires as integral parts of the structuration process can be considered in these terms.

**Epistemological Aspects of Methodology:** The conceptualization of changing time and space coordinates of social life as the constitutive mediums of cultural repertoires, intrinsic to social relations and institutions, and, thus, as flexibly limiting frames for CRs as symbolic guideposts of action, makes the analysis of such frames, both at the structural and the individual level, into an inherently historical undertaking. From these epistemological premises a rule of inquiry can be derived.: Why cultural repertoires (CRs) as structures and as personal “tool kits” come into being, change, or persist, is explained by showing how they do it. The “why” is explained by the “how,” when we explain and further demonstrate “how” the cultural repertoires have been shaped over time through changing circumstances (Sewell 1996; Calhoun 1996, Isaac 1997).

**Research Theory:** Although this epistemological approach precludes construction of general, universal theories, it by no means abandons theory altogether. Studies of cultural repertoires conceptualized in historical, context-contingent structuration frameworks can profit from the scrutiny and elaboration of the theoretical principles guiding socio-historical inquiry that have been offered by historical sociologists. Hall (1999) distinguishes, for example, between the particularizing and generalizing strategies of explanation.

In the particularizing strategy the major emphasis is on the explanation of cases or the interpretation of one case. This can include “specific history” or “configurational history.” This might involve identifying “the relevant range of structural possibilities.”

In the generalizing strategy, according to Hall, the thrust is the fitting or generating of theory. This might involve detailed examination of the utility of a model according to its “ability to convincingly order the evidence” (Skocpol and Somers 1980, cited by Hall 1999). It can also involve “analytical generalization,” which has as its purpose empirical/historical testing of hypotheses about “transitory regularities” (Joynt and Rescher 1981). A third generalizing strategy can be “contrast-oriented comparison.”

The conceptualization of cultural repertoires (CRs) accommodates very well some of Hall's particularizing and generalizing theoretical strategies.

**Methods of Research:** As inherently historical phenomena, CRs also require that the concern about the workings and effects of different temporal dimensions of meaningful social interactions be an integral part of research. Temporal dimensions include the pace or tempo of events and activities, their duration, rhythm or regularity, and their trajectory of sequence. Different methods of sociohistorical inquiry are not just based on exclusively qualitative or quantitative research methods.

The treatment of cultural repertoires is undoubtedly a challenge for researchers because of the irreducible complexity and multiple contingency of the investigated processes and the indeterminacy of the results. But, as several research projects informed by the approach have amply demonstrated, this approach—in terms of Methodology, research theory, and research methods—generates encompassing, robust and nuanced accounts of the unfolding structuration of socio-cultural phenomena. For example, this includes treating CRs as structures and tool kits and matters of agency and then considering how the structure-agency divide is re-constituted by CRs and tool kits over time.

**Brief Summary of the Research Project:** It is not possible to even begin to summarize all of the nuances of the situation here, but a few words can be said by way of summary. The study concerns orientations and coping strategies of undocumented migrant workers. Within temporarily stable economic and political macro-structural conditions in sender and receiver countries, the realization of Polish tourist workers’ goals required mutual trust among the actors engaged with each other in negotiating structures. This mutual trust is based on everybody involved keeping their word and playing fair according to shared cultural codes. A deviation from the shared cultural codes (CRs) results in group ostracism. Migrants wish to sojourn in Berlin as long as possible in order to accumulate maximum possible savings. As migrants overstay their visas and continue clan-
destine employment, the individual cultural tools become a culture structure – a socially embedded and normatively sanctioned cluster of guideposts for planning and executing the desired projects that, in turn, sustains the individual cultural codes (coda). The structuration model posits the mutual reconstitution over time of structure and agency. However, that reconstitution over time allows for alterations in the pattern of the reciprocal engagements that spring from actor’s motivations in the schemas and resources informing their actions. The changed situations in which the actors find themselves are particularly conducive to such innovations. Although habituated strategies from the past (i.e. “beat-the-system-bend-the-law strategies of the homo sovieticus tool kit) constituted the basic components of these migrants’ group CRs and personal “tool kits” for the pursuit of their projects, some novel aspects of their situations have mobilized them to devise and to put into practice innovative ways to deal with the new, altered circumstances.

In the German and other Western European media, Polish tourist workers, male and female, have been reported as laboring “docilely” for twelve or fourteen hours a day in conditions that no native workers would tolerate. The willingness of the Polish migrant sojourners to work very hard for long hours under exhausting conditions and to live in overcrowded, often substandard quarters allows those illicit migrants to save and take home up to seventy percent of the average monthly income accrued during their Berlin stay. The “migration culture” that informs their income saving strategies abroad is also being transplanted to sender communities. Returning worker tourists become “role models” for coping in the new, capitalist system. Their visible success (e.g. more middle-class “status symbol” objects) not only sustains out-going migratory flows, but also presents new sets of CRs and individual tools.

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How Culture Works in Social Life

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These papers are rich, stimulating and provocative. They seek to unravel the role that culture plays in concrete social life and to advance theoretical understanding of human behavior. I was struck by the degree of analytical agreement that cuts across Swidler’s, Silver’s, McLean’s and Morawska’s papers. I was also struck by the degree to which these papers underemphasized or ignored key factors I believe to be crucial to understanding how culture works in social life and to the development of a robust conceptual framework of cultural dynamics.

These papers agree that cultural phenomena are crucial components of social life that cannot be reduced to other more “fundamental” reality such as social structures, social networks or institutions. Thus the authors declare that cultural matters must be assigned considerable analytical autonomy. All of these authors stress, however, that cultural phenomena are deeply embedded in social structures and other social processes and that, therefore, culture is to be viewed as entangled and deeply rooted in reciprocal relations. They argue that culture and social structure mutually shape, constrain and enable each other. Thus, cultural analysts should always focus on the dynamic reciprocal relationships between culture and social structure.

The authors are also agreed that culture—its belief systems, symbols, values, habits, etc.—does not constitute a unified whole. Indeed, in any society cultural materials are in a continuous state of change and many of its components exist in an uneasy state of tension. In fact, many cultural components within a society, a group or a single individual may operate in a contradictory manner. Thus, our authors resist any unified deterministic theory of culture. So all these formulations, whether it is tool kit theory, cultural repertoire theory, frame analysis or narrative analysis are reluctant to advance a unified theory of culture with a clear causal structure. But herein lies a thorny problem. That is, any useful and robust theory must identify and map out patterns that speak to causal orderings. Good theories soak up the booming, buzzing, confusion of social life and reveal the predictable patterns undergirding apparent chaos.

But discovering such patterns is tricky business for cultural analysts because they theorize that the very nature of their object of study—culture—is constantly changing, often contradictory, often in flux and nondeterministic. How then are they to discover causal patterns in phenomena that are theorized to be dynamic moving targets? The authors’ scientific challenges propel them to seek to discover the hidden patterns and internal logic that must underlie cultural matters. They know that if they are unable to discover such patterns, such internal logic, their theoretical enterprise runs the risk of drying up like a raisin in the sun. Lo and behold, these authors have independently discovered what they believe to be this inner logic. For the most part, they have reached the same conclusion: Institutions largely structure and anchor cultural phenomena. Yet, they still assign a great deal of autonomy to culture both in terms of its role in social life and in their theoretical formulations. Nevertheless, when all is said and done, there is an institutional logic that largely patterns culture. Thus, for McLean, institutionally specified, historically specific approach to cultural repertoires is the analytical strategy that should be pursued. He argues that, “the legitimate availability of elements in the cultural repertoire is determined by institutional relationships” and that “the path to an understanding of the social dimensions of a collective identity lies in understanding its relationship to institutions, in the sense that institutions are the ground on which the figure of the collective identity is visible.” Similarly, Silver emphasizes the role that structural factors play in shaping cultural practices. She is also interested in the possibility that culture itself may contain an internal logic whereby some cultural repertoires change. However, I am still struck by the weight she assigns to structural factors. Structures may be dominant in the shaping of formations and may order the workings of lesser cultural manifestations, cultural trajectories and repertoires. Similarly, I am struck by
the weight Morawska assigns to migrating networks in shaping the cultural experiences and actions of Polish migrants.

Swidler is the clearest. For her, an institutional logic patterns and drives culture. Thus, she argues, “that dominant understandings of love are reproduced by the dilemmas of action created by the institution of marriage”. Furthermore, “the institution of marriage in some sense generates the culture of love”. Swidler states that, “institutions set the problem actors solve” and that institutional gaps generate diverse repertoires. When there are no institutional gaps, culture plays itself out in a routine manner. However, when institutional gaps are present, culture is elaborated because people need to develop new lines of action. Culture, therefore, in Swidler’s scheme is the helpmate of institutions. Cultural innovations blossom when institutions are no longer able to dictate human action effectively. Cultural repertoires are constructed to fill institutional gaps. Indeed, Swidler writes, “if these cultural repertoires are solutions to similarly structured problems because the institutional gaps people confront are similar, then the repertoire of solutions will, nonetheless have a similar logic—not a psychological logic, but an institutional one”. Clearly, for Swidler, institutions bring theoretical order to the house of culture both socially and analytically.

I think efforts to reconnect culture to institutional and structural logic will yield analytical dividends. Culture is not a disembodied Hegelian enterprise. I believe that under certain conditions culture may drive institutional phenomena while under others, institutional logic may function as the driving force. Only empirical research can establish which logic prevails in concrete historical moments.

In my view, all of the authors are too silent on how power, domination and human agency affect cultural phenomena. I found it interesting that none of the authors mentioned leadership. Leaders are important for they formulate action strategies, mobilize constituencies, manage uncertainty and the media, and they have disproportionate access to institutional and cultural power. Leaders often embody the cultural symbols that can ignite the engines of institutions. Lamont (2000: p135) is right to argue that it is important to take into account how “remote and proximate structural factors shape choices from and access to the tool kit and that these factors affect the cultural resources most likely to be mobilized by different types of individuals and what elements of tool-kits people have most access to given their social positions.” Leaders are generally the individuals occupying strategic institutional spaces conducive to utilizing the tools in the cultural kit.

The Black Church provides an excellent example. The pulpit is the most powerful space in that institution and is considered sacred ground accessible only to clergy. This is one of the reasons why ministers like Martin Luther King, Jr. wielded enormous power during the civil rights movement. Through the pulpit, such leaders were able to use the extensive resources of the Black Church to mobilize and sustain the movement. Leaders in SNCC, CORE and the NAACP envied the ministers who controlled the sacred space of the pulpit. James Farmer, the charismatic leader of CORE, once told me if he could do it all over again, he would attend seminary and become a pastor so he could have access to the pulpit. Social position plays a crucial role in determining who can effectively access cultural repertoires and cultural tools.

Finally, institutions are not equal. Cultural analysts need to investigate the differential power of institutions. Some house enormous cultural and social power making it possible for them to order the action and agendas of lesser institutions in profound ways. For example, historically the Black Church has towered above all other Black institutions because of its organizational resources and because it has functioned as the repository of Black culture. Elsewhere, (Morris, 2000) I have argued that such formations should be conceptualized as agency-laded institutions because they are often longstanding and house enormous cultural and organizational

UC Davis Visual Worlds Conference Focuses Interdisciplinary Themes

Blake Stimson, UC Davis

The Visual Worlds conference organized by John R. Hall and Blake Stimson for the UC Davis Center for History, Society, and Culture was a truly exceptional and exciting event for several reasons but perhaps first and foremost by virtue of its interdisciplinarity and by the happenstance of its timing. Held October 26 to 28, 2001, it featured presentations by a lineup of internationally known artists and scholars from a variety of fields including art history, literary theory and criticism, cultural studies, film and television studies, intellectual history and sociology and from across the US, Europe and Australia. The central question that the conference sought to address—how our understanding and experience of vision is changing now under pressures from the various social, economic and cultural factors that are linked together under the term globalization—was complicated and made all the more pressing by the geopolitical realignment inaugurated by the attacks of September 11th. The question of the consequences of the attacks generally and for the history of vision specifically was
Spillman, Lyn, editor. *Cultural Sociology*. Malden, MA: Blackwell. After grounding the collection in seven classic works by authors ranging from Ruth Benedict to Pierre Bourdieu, Spillman reprints 24 articles that capture the conceptual essence and empirical thrust of contemporary cultural sociology. These are grouped into four groups. The first focuses on cultural repertoires, identities, and practices. The second deals with cultural production. The third is about distilling cultural categories, genres, and narrative. The final section focuses on social change and the elaboration of symbolic forms. The selections are cut down from their original length, but Spillman seems to capture what is essential in each. Collectively the articles provide an excellent review of the best in the cultural sociology of the last quarter century, and Spillman’s brief but richly annotated editorial notes following each article provide numerous pointers on how the field can move forward from here.

Bennett, Andy. *Cultures of Popular Music*. Buckingham, UK: Open University Press. Bennet provides an excellent survey of the characteristics and cultural meaning of the various genres of music in the rock era as seen from the UK. Four chapters are devoted to the history and politics of rock, and the other six chapters focus in turn on heavy metal, punk, reggae, rap, bhanga, and contemporary dance music.

Tatum, Charles M. *Chicano Popular Culture*. Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press. Tatum provides a very useful if necessarily superficial account of the development of Mexican-American popular culture from the mid-nineteenth century to the present. He focuses on music, cinema, newspapers, radio, television, popular literature, and popular celebrations.

Drew, Rob. *Karaoke Nights: An Ethnographic Rhapsody*. Walnut Creek, CA: Altamira Press. Based in the ideas of ethnomethodology, Drew provides a richly illustrated ethnographic account of the karaoke scene and the people who find themselves in the songs they enact.

Ogg, Alex with David Upshall. *The Hip Hop Years: A History of Rap*. New York: Fromm International. Ogg and Upshall furnish a close up look at the development of rap that is rich with quotes and reflections. They show how antagonistic cooperation energizes the scene and propels it forward.


Edles, Laura Desfor. *Cultural Sociology in Practice*. Malden, MA: Blackwell. In this introduction to cultural sociology Edles first defines culture and then links culture to questions of religion and ideology, the media, and race. She concludes by exploring three appropriate methodologies: naturalistic inquiry, discourse analysis, and the pairing of structure and agency in a comprehensive cultural sociology. Study questions are provided at the end of each chapter.

Gibbs, Graham R. *Qualitative Data Analysis: Explorations with NVivo*. Buckingham, UK: Open University Press. Gibbons applies the powerful new computer package NVivo to key questions in qualitative research to show how it facilitates data analysis and

Newell, Stephanie. *Ghanaian Popular Fiction*. Ohio University Press: Athens, OH. This is a study of the street-level side of African fiction – the largely undocumented writing, publishing, and reading of pamphlets and booklets published since the 1930s. This literature existing beyond the reach of international publishing houses, Newell finds is a preoccupation with questions of marriage, manhood, and money in a rapidly changing society.

Bond, George and Diane M. Ciekawy, editors. *Witchcraft Dialogues: Anthropological and Philosophical Dialogues*. Ohio University Press: Athens, OH. While many Africanists shun the study of witchcraft as an inappropriate subject, these authors show how the occult permeates contemporary African thoughtways.


Rabin, Robert and Stephen D. Sugarman, editors. *Regulating Tobacco*. New York: Oxford University Press. The authors examine specific strategies that have been used to influence tobacco use including taxation, regulation of advertising and promotion, regulation of indoor smoking, etc. in the context of the changing cultural mood of the times.

**Princeton’s Multi-Faceted Baker’s Dozen**

Stark, Rodney. *One True God: Historical Consequences of Monotheism*. By ranging over 2,600 years of written records and drawing examples from Judaism, Christianity, and Muhammadism, Stark shows the power of monotheism in the development of the West.

Fine, Gary Alan. *Gifted Tongues: High School Debate and Adolescent Culture*. Fine explores the complex cultural world built by generations of high school debate teams. He notes the useful role that this choreography of competition and cooperation plays in socialization and suggests ways of reshaping this experience to make it available to a wider range of adolescents.

Griswold, Wendy. *Bearing Witness: Readers, Writers, and the Novel in Nigeria*. Griswold shows how the remarkable literature of Nigeria grew out of the needs of local readers, international publishers, and writers wanting to explore the anguished and rich textures of life in an imperial colonial colony becoming a developing nation.

Fligstein, Neil. *The Architecture of Markets*. Fligstein argues that markets are not defined by abstract laws of demand and supply but are social constructions that require extensive institutional support to function. Basing his work on the growing body of empirical work in this perspective, he seeks out the theory underlying the empirical work.

White, Harrison C. *Markets from Networks: Socioeconomic Models of Production*. White sees markets not as the results of abstract economic forces but as socio-cultural constructs created and sustained by networks of producers and consumers. In this model producers act less in response to actual demand than to the actions of their competitors.

Chwe, Michael Suk-Young. *Rational Ritual: Culture, Coordination, and Common Knowledge.* Based on a wide range of illustrations from diverse historical situations, Chwe proposes rational choice underpinnings for symbolic interactionism.

Sunstein, Cass. *Republic.com.* Sunstein says the internet opens up worlds of information to millions, but that our ability to preselect the information we want to see and the commentary we want to read means that the internet creates a virtual newspaper that might be called the Daily Me. He questions the effect of this myopic view on democracy and the health of the republic—as if everyone in the Good Old Days used to read a number of newspapers or even read everything in one.

Stevens, Mitchell L. *Kingdom of Children: Culture and Controversy in the Homeschooling Movement.* Stevens shows that the philosophical and religious convictions of parents transform homeschooling into a social movement that serves as a parable of the organizational strategies of the progressive left and the religious right since the 1960s.

Markovits, Andrei S. and Steven L. Hellerman. *Offside: Soccer and American Exceptionalism.* The games most passionately followed throughout the world—cricket, tennis, rugby, golf, and especially soccer—were created in England. But in the US the prime games—football, baseball, basketball, and hockey—all had their origins in North America. By exploring the remarkable case of soccer in America, the authors try to account for this American Exceptionalism.

Gross, Jan T. *Neighbors: The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland.* One fine summer day in 1941, the Christian half of the Polish town of Jedwabne murdered the Jewish half—1,600 souls in all. This deceptively simple story forces the reader beyond the simplistic notion that the Holocaust was engineered by a few mad Germans.

Mendelberg, Tali. *The Race Card: Campaign Strategy, Implicit Messages, and the Norm of Equality.* Mendelberg tracks the evolution of political rhetoric about race from the Civil War to the present. As in the case of George Bush’s use of the Willie Horton story, he focuses on how and when politicians play the race card, all the while “plausibly” denying that they do so.

Brown, Wendy. *Politics Out of History.* The nineteenth-century American worldview was based on the Modernist belief in progress on all fronts. Brown traces how, over the course of the twentieth century, political action becomes increasingly grounded in moralistic high-handedness and crass opportunism. But weren’t the latter always there? So what does replace the belief in progress?

Four from Routledge

**Four from the University of Minnesota Press**

Lipsitz, George. *American Studies in a Moment of Danger.* Lipsitz argues that this is a moment of danger for the discipline of American Studies because the resources on which it has depended—the self-made ethnic, racial, gender, and class cultures—are rapidly disappearing under the weight of global corporate mass media images and understandings.

Topp, Michael Miller. *Those Without a Country: The Political Culture of Italian American Syndicalists.* Topp tells the story of the Italian American syndicalist movement and the ethnic community from which it arose. Using Italian language as well as English language sources, he highlights the politics of the Progressive Era, immigration, community formation, gender, and working-class history.

Chin, Elizabeth. *Purchasing Power: Black Kids and American Consumer Culture.* Chin reports back from the world of Black children living in hardship in order to understand the ways they learn to managing living poor in a wealthy society. Air Jordans.

Rosen, Philip. *Change Mummified: Cinema. Historicity. Theory.* This is Rosen’s take on how film is related to the many modern practices that define themselves as configuring pastness. Film is seen as an accurate mirror of the past or as a display of the views of those who make them.

**Six from Sage**

Turner, Bryan S. and Chris Rojek, *Society and Culture: Scarcity and Solidarity.* The authors ask whether the flowering of cultural studies makes sociology superfluous. The say that by beginning from a reinterpretation of Talcott Parsons’ theory of action, classical theory can be revivified to counter the anti-scientific turn of cultural studies.

Richardson, Michael, *The Experience of Culture.* Richardson adds his vote to the view that culture does not grow out of human experience but is part and parcel of it.

Scott, Allen J. *The Cultural Economy of Cities: Essays on the Geography of Image-Producing Industries.* Focusing on Paris and Los Angeles, Scott argues that the global cities are the home of the culture industries.

Wilson, Elizabeth, *The Contradictions of Culture: Cities, Culture, Women.* Scott shows that debates within feminism on the nature and effects of pornography illustrate the contemporary contradictions of culture and raises doubts about the coherence of postmodernism itself.

Wright, Will, *The Wild West: The Mythical Cowboy and Social The-
Will Wright follows up on his classic *Six Guns and Society* to show that the image of the Wild West with its accents on rugged male individualism and critique of collective regulation appeals widely throughout the world today. This image, he finds, fits the needs of global capitalism, male superiority, and environmental deregulation.

Thompson, Denise, *Radical Feminism Today*. Thompson questions much of what has been taken for granted as 'feminism' and points to the limitations of defining feminism in terms of ‘women’, ‘gender’, ‘difference’, and ‘race/gender/class’ while exploring the contemporary alternatives to these established perspectives.

**Four from the University of California Press**

Horowitz, Donald L. *The Deadly Ethnic Riot*. Horowitz makes a careful analysis of approximately 150 riots in which civilian members of one ethnic group killed civilian members of another ethnic group. Most of these are drawn from Asia, Africa, and the former Soviet Union. Furious and sadistic, nevertheless, such riots are not spontaneous collective behavior but are directed against specific classes of targets.

Mills, Kathryn and Pamela Mills, editors. *Mills, C. Wright: Letters and Autobiographical Writings*. This collection of personal documents, edited by his daughters, allows readers to see behind Mills’ public persona.


Harvey David, *Spaces of Hope*. Based in the works of Karl Marx, Harvey argues that we need to use social geography to become architects of a new living and working environment that allows for bridging the micro-scale of the body and the global political economy.

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Remind your colleagues and students to renew their section membership!